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This dissertation is composed by three essays that explore the relationship between good IT 
governance and effective information security services.  Governance steers and verifies 
performance of fiduciary duties, through the implementation of proper governance mechanisms.  
With a focus on information security, this essay presents three categories of governance 
mechanisms – process-based, structural, and relational.  When properly instituted, they work 
together to ensure that IT understands business requirements for information security and strives 
to fulfill them.  An explanation is offered about the efficacy of those mechanisms, based on an 
agency theory perspective that views IT as an agent for business.  The two underlying causes for 
agency problems are goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and the 
principal.  Governance mechanisms help to reduce both goal incongruence and information 
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CHAPTER 1 WHAT COLOR IS YOUR ARCHETYPE? GOVERNANCE 
PATTERNS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
Security managers have long lamented the lack of top management support, insufficient budget 
for tooling up security, the proverbial user who just can’t refrain from opening the suspicious 
email attachment, and so on.  But now senior managers are taking their refrains more seriously. 
Among other things, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has catapulted discussion about accountability for 
information security onto the agenda of boards of directors meetings. These boards are 
recognizing the importance of IT governance for ensuring information security and enhancing 
accountability. It is not a matter of whether, but when and how, companies should bring 
information security under the umbrella of IT governance. This paper provides a perspective on 
making governance decisions about information security. 
 
IT governance aligns the actions of IT staff with business goals through monitoring and 
empowerment.  Empowerment comes from granting the right to make decisions.  However, it 
should not be done randomly or on a whim.  It requires carefully allocating decision rights for 
given areas of responsibilities. 
 
Herbert Simon (1960) suggests that the nature of decisions dictates where each important class of 
organizational decisions should be made.  Neither centralizing nor decentralizing decision 
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making is always a good thing.  Rather a company must delegate the “natural subdivision” for 
each major decision. 
 
Weill and Ross (2004) revisit Simon when they define IT governance as “specifying the decision 
rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in using IT (p. 2).”  Weill 
and Ross categorize IT decisions into five major classes: IT principles, IT architecture, IT 
infrastructure, business application needs, and IT investment and prioritization.  Their study of 
256 enterprises shows that high performing companies use the proper decision right allocation 
pattern for each major class of IT decisions.   
 
Weill and Ross use political archetypes to accentuate differences among allocation patterns.  
Table 1.1 summarizes prescribed decision rights allocations for each archetype.  Business 
monarchy and feudal archetypes place business executives or business unit heads, respectively, 
at the helm when it comes to security decisions.  With the federal archetype both the business 
unit and corporate management hold decision rights.  In contrast, the IT monarchy puts 
information security decisions squarely on the shoulders of the IT professionals.  In the IT 
duopoly decisions are made by both IT executives and business executives/leaders, while no IT 
governance is practiced with anarchy. 
 
For security professionals looking for solutions to problems they encounter, this framework 
provides a new perspective – a mismatch between decision rights and decision class.  For 
example, one common sin is treating information security solely as a technical issue and forcing 
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security-related organizational or human decisions upon reluctant IT “techies” who are ill-
equipped for making such decisions.   
 
Table 1.1 Weill and Ross IT Governance Archetypes 
Archetype Decision Right Distribution Explanation about the Role of IT 
Business 
monarchy 
Senior business executives 
make IT decisions for the 
entire enterprise. The IT 
executive is considered as 
one voice in the decision 
making. 
Business executives make the decisions about 
with security with  the corporate IT head, the 
CIO, as an equal partner with other executives. 
IT monarchy IT professionals make the IT 
decisions. 
IT can be implemented in many different 
flavors, involving IT professionals at corporate 
IT or business unit IT to variable degrees. 
Feudal Business unit management 
makes IT decisions. 
Either corporate IT or business unit IT or both 
can be involved in decision making as well. 
Federal Involving both the corporate 
center and business units. 
Either corporate IT or business unit IT or both 
can be involved in decision making as well. 
IT duopoly Decisions are made by the 
duo of IT executives and 
either corporate business 
executives or business unit 
leaders. 
This archetype also incarnate in one of these 
two forms: 
(a) “Bicycle wheel” with the corporate IT at the 
hub.  Sitting at the rim are the business units, 
each of which forms a spoke together with the 
hub; or  
(b) “T” arrangement, with the IT executive 
having overlapping memberships in an 
executive committee and an IT committee. 
Anarchy No IT governance.  
 
No single governance archetype provides a one-size-fits-all pattern for security decision making.  
Weill and Ross’ framework treats “security and risk” merely as a cluster in “IT infrastructure 
services.”  We think this classification is too narrow and instead propose that IT security affects 
the entire IT gamut. We illustrate our point by discussing six critical success factors (CSF) for 
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information security that are frequently discussed in the security literature. We identify the most 
suitable governance archetype for each CSF class.  
 
1.1 CSF 1: Information Security Strategy – IT Principles 
A company’s information security strategy “is a related set of high-level statements about how 
IT is used in the business (Weill and Ross, 2004, p. 27).”  It is built upon such IT principles as 
protecting the confidentiality of customer information, strict compliance with regulations, 
maintaining a security baseline that is above the industry benchmark, etc. (Egan, 2005). 
 
Security strategies of companies in the same line of business may differ dramatically.  For 
instance, a software company’s strategy may aggressively value time-to-market over security 
when building its products.  It may alternatively be paranoid about secure coding.  Microsoft had 
adopted the first strategy for a long time. After enough criticisms were leveled, it decided to 
adopt a different strategy with its Trustworthy Computing initiative that aims to be “secure by 
design, secure by default, secure in deployment” (Wylder, 2004).  While Microsoft Windows has 
long been associated with lax security, Java’s security record is impressive and seems to be an 
outcome of Sun’s strategy to bake security into the product from day one.  
 
Security strategy is hardly a technical decision.  It is often defined based on the company’s 
mission, overall strategy, business model, and the demands of its business environment.  
Deciding on the security strategy, therefore, requires decision makers who thoroughly 
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understand the company’s strategic view and management system (LeVeque, 2006).  In contrast, 
decision makers need not be well-versed in information security implementation.  Thus, a 
business monarchy is a good match for such situations in which the top business executives set 
the tone for the company’s security.  As part of the business monarchy’s “ruling class,” the CIO 
handles the reality check of the decided security strategy.  If necessary, the IT function provides 
the required technical input for supporting the decision. 
 
1.2 CSFs 2 & 3: Security Policies and Technical Architecture – IT Architecture 
These two CSF deal with IT architecture, or  “the organizing logic for data, applications, and 
infrastructure, captured in a set of policies, relationships, and technical choices to achieve desired 
business and technical standardization and integration (Weill and Ross, 2004, p. 30)."   
 
CSF 2 is concerned with logical, business-oriented architecture.  Architecture supports the 
standardization and integration requirements based on a company’s business strategy (Ross, 
Weill, and Robertson, 2006; Weill and Ross, 2004).  Standardization ensures the uniformity that 
encourages efficient business processes.  Integration builds on uniform data definition to allow 
sharing of data across business processes, thus enhancing efficiency, coordination, and agility 
(Ross et al, 2006). 
 
Security policies, a critical success factor, encourage standardization and integration. Following 
best practices, they broadly define the scope of and overall expectations for the company’s 
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information security program.  From these, lower-level policies are derived to control specific 
security areas (e.g., Internet use, access control, etc.) and/or individual applications (e.g., payroll 
systems, telecom systems, etc.) (Peltier, 2004).  A goal of security policies is standardizing 
behavior.  Supplemented by security standards, guidelines, and procedures, policies maintain 
standardized employee behaviors where security is concerned (Tudor, 2001). 
 
Among the various policies, information asset classification policy particularly helps integration.  
Asset classification is an important first step for security programs because it informs company 
decisions about which information assets to protect.  Although it does not target integration 
directly, the exercise of identifying, categorizing, and entrusting information assets with 
responsible parties greatly facilitates data standardization and sharing. 
 
Weill and Ross (2004) observe that in many companies senior management relegates architecture 
decisions to IT even though many high-level architecture decisions have substantial business 
significance.  Business leaders are needed to maintain a strategic business view (Ross et al, 
2006).  Still, IT leaders should not be excluded for two reasons.  First, their judgment prevents 
unrealistic goals for standardization and integration.  Second, policy decisions require the ability 
to analyze the technical and security implications of user behaviors and business processes.  
Thus, for high-level security architecture decisions, IT duopoly is a good fit. 
 
CSF 3 is the ‘technical security architecture’ (e.g., Panko, 2004).  It provides the organizing logic 
for security infrastructure components and focuses on designing a company’s network and 
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security topology.  For instance, a very widely used security typology is demilitarized zones 
(DMZs).  DMZs provide a buffer between the public, presumably hostile, Internet and the 
company’s internal networks.  DMZ design calls for a series of decisions on firewall setup and 
server configuration so that they can be placed strategically to form a DMZ.  In a larger picture, 
DMZs are part of a layered protection architecture whose design involves numerous technical 
decisions. DMZs require a high level of technical expertise. 
 
The matching archetype for this CSF is fairly straightforward. Having business leaders make 
technical architecture decisions is not only micromanagement, but also infeasible because they 
lack the technical know-how.  IT monarchy fits these decisions well because only IT managers 
have the technical expertise to design and implement such systems. 
 
1.3 CSF 4: Information Security Infrastructure – IT Infrastructure 
"IT infrastructure is the shared and reliable services used by multiple applications (Weill and 
Ross, 2004).”  Security infrastructure provides protection by arranging security mechanisms 
according to the security architecture specifications. 
 
The most conspicuous mechanisms are those directly related to security.  Firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs), encryption devices are the most popular examples.  Many mechanisms 
are either hardware or software solutions.  The hardware often has some performance advantage, 
while software offers richer functionality.  The other major part of infrastructure is built by 
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hardening existing network infrastructure components and computing platforms.  For instance, 
the primary function of routers and switches is to provide network connectivity.  However, they 
can act as the first line of defense with their security-related configuration such as access lists, 
virtual LANs, etc.  
 
Decisions in this class are concerned with technology selection and configuration.  Common 
objectives are to achieve consistency in protection, economy of scale, and synergy among the 
components.  For these reasons, corporate IT typically is responsible for managing the dedicated 
security mechanisms.  Also, general IT infrastructure such as enterprise network devices (the 
second component above) often is centrally controlled by corporate IT.  Thus, to use Simon’s 
terminology, corporate IT is the “natural subdivision” for security infrastructure decisions.  In 
other words, the fitting governance pattern for these decisions is IT monarchy, where corporate 
IT takes the lead. 
 
1.4 CSF 5: Business Requirements for Security – Business Application Needs 
IT architecture and infrastructure would be castles in the air if they did not serve business needs 
and create value.  Two conflicting objectives must be balanced when identifying a firm’s needs – 
creativity and discipline.  Creativity aims at new and more effective ways of delivering customer 
value using IT.  However, when necessary, a company should be ready to sacrifice creativity for 
discipline (e.g. enforcing hardware or software standardization) so that architectural integrity can 
be preserved (Weill and Ross, 2004). 
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Similarly, companies often must balance the enhanced information security gained from 
adhering to security policies against productivity losses and user inconvenience.  As security 
attacks become more sophisticated, obeying security measures to deflect those attacks places 
increased cognitive demands on users (e.g., long passwords with special characters for system 
logon) and sacrifices productivity (e.g., the daily chore of scanning emails to spot phishing 
attempts).  
 
Identifying and fulfilling business users’ security requirements are essential for legitimate, 
successful information security programs.  Business requirements are the basis for writing 
security policies.  They also impact what security managers see as critical, but tough, challenges: 
security training and user awareness.  This is because when a training program is tied to the 
unique requirements of individual business processes, it stands a better chance for effectiveness 
and post-training retention. 
 
Security requirements are determined by evaluating risks.  This evaluation requires two key 
inputs – the computing infrastructure and the way in which people use it to perform their jobs.  
Perspectives from both IT and business are important in understanding the risks a company faces 
and how to mitigate them (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003).  This is a critical process during which 
business users express what they want out of the information security program and how they 
expect the security function to support their business activities.  These requirements have 
resounding effects as they will be incorporated into security policies and fulfilled with security 
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mechanisms.  On the other hand, IT understands issues related to the IT infrastructure and what 
are needed to keep it running.  IT duopoly thus fits business application needs decisions best.  
Such a governance pattern reconciles rivaling needs for security and achieves the delicate 
security-productivity trade-off. 
 
1.5 CSF 6: Information Security Investments – IT Investment and Prioritization 
The “FUD factor” (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) used to be all that was needed to get top 
management to plunk down money on information security.  As information security becomes a 
routine concern in daily operations, increasingly security managers need to justify their budget 
requests financially.  A recent empirical study (Gordon and Loeb, 2006) finds that companies are 
starting to use the Net Present Value (NPV) method to make decisions about security spending.  
According to the CSI/FBI (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005) survey, 38% of the 
respondents use Return on Investment (ROI) analysis, 18% use Net Present Value (NPV), and 
19%, Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for IT security investments. 
  
Of course, many more factors are at play when a company evaluates information security 
investments.  Qualitative cost-benefit assessments often supplement, or even substitute for, more 
quantitative financial analytical methods.  As when determining business needs, different units 
within the company may have rival or conflicting “wishlists” for information security-related 
purchases that benefit their unique needs.  The IT function also should have a significant say in 
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these decisions as it is in the best position to assess whether and how the investments may fit 
with the company’s current IT infrastructure and application portfolio. 
 
Thus, the most suitable governance pattern for investment and prioritization decisions is IT-
business duopoly.  In particular, the T-arrangement duopoly pattern (see Table 1.1) fits this type 
of decision well.  The most typical governance mechanism for this archetype is executive 
committees/councils composed of business and IT executives, such as the IT steering committee 
and budget committee, with the CIO having overlapping memberships in both. These committees 
are the venue at which IT and business leaders make business cases for their proposed 
investments and debate the merit and priorities of the investments.  Decisions then are made with 
the company’s best interest in mind. 
 
1.6 Matching Archetypes with Decision Classes 
We discussed six critical success factors for information security. For each, we suggested a 
governance pattern that best suits decisions in that area (see Table 1.2 for a summary).  These 
decision class-archetype matches, however, are by no means etched in stone.  Unique 
organizational and environmental factors may require some deviation.  For instance, it is easy to 
imagine that business monarchy governs security investments decisions if a company 
emphasizes stringent budget review and control from a pure business/financial perspective.  At 
enterprises with many relatively independent business units, a federal archetype that involves the 
corporate center, business unit leaders, and IT leaders may be the proper archetype for business 
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requirement decisions.  Alternatively, the corporate culture may even render a feudal archetype 
the only choice.  
 
That said, because of the nature of different IT decisions, each decision class lends itself best to 
governance under a certain archetype.  Wise companies know this and vary the governance 
patterns for different decision classes.  That is why Weill and Ross (2004) studied those 236 
enterprises to identify the archetypes used by some of corporate America’s most successful 
companies for governing IT decisions in the five classes.  Their empirical data show that 
organizations differ significantly in their selected archetypes for allocating decision rights for 
different decision classes.  For instance, duopoly is used by the largest portion (36%) of 
organizations for IT principles decisions; for IT infrastructure decisions, IT monarchy (59%) is 
the most popular. 
 
Mismatched archetypes have negative security consequences.  An example is the state 
government described by Tudor (2001).  The government includes 11 agencies and departments 
and has adopted a feudal archetype for IT infrastructure decisions. This is an obvious mismatch 
because IT monarchy typically is most proper for infrastructure decisions. Since decisions 
regarding the infrastructural components are made in the 11 departments locally, duplications 
abound; efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and communication suffer; and these create an 
environment that makes efficient management of security infrastructure difficult.  Tudor’s 
prescription for this problem clearly targets the governance pattern: educate the department 
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management on security; do not force security decisions on them; and provide incentive for the 
departments to follow. 
 
Governance patterns thus have significant implications for companies when assigning security 
responsibilities and accountabilities.  The taxonomy of decision classes lays out a logical way to 
group key security decisions and ensure that all important bases are covered.  The archetypes 
clearly define the responsibilities of the major players in the company – business executives, 
business unit leaders, corporate IT, business unit IT, etc.  By matching the proper archetypes to 
the key security decisions, the board of directors in effect puts the decisions in the hands of those 
who are in the most appropriate positions for making quality decisions.  In addition, decision 
makers are truly empowered when they are bestowed the authority to make decisions that (1) are 
suitable for their positions in the organizational hierarchy; (2) make the best use of their 
expertise and knowledge; and (3) cater to the needs and specialization of the organization units 
to which they belong.   
 
Common, recurrent security problems (patchwork, shotgun approaches to security programs, 
security policies copied from Information Security for Dummies, improper security mechanisms, 
cookie-cutter security training programs, insufficient or lavish security investments, etc.) can all 
be traced to not having the right decision makers.   Therefore, for information security, 
application of proper archetypes increases the chance that critical success factors are facilitated 
with good decisions.  Just as nations with healthy political systems grow and prosper, 
information security programs under the governance of proper archetypes thrive.  When security 
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managers present their cases to the board, citing IT Governance not only is easier for the 
audience to understand but also may create more lasting effects than if they cite Hacking 
Exposed. 
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templates.  
Unenforceable due to 
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bypass or undermine 
security measures.  
Poor result from user 
training and 
awareness programs.  
IT duopoly Security should provide 
services to business 
users.  Needs to achieve 
balance between security 
and productivity.  










information security.  
Waste or insufficiency 
in human or technical 
resources for security. 
IT duopoly Requires financial 
(quantitative) and 
qualitative evaluation of 
business impacts of 
security investments.  
Business case has to be 




1.7 Chapter 1 List of Reference 
1.  Alberts, C., & Dorofee, A. (2003). Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE 
Approach. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
2.  Egan, M. (2005). The Executive Guide to Information Security: Threats, Challenges, and 
Solutions. Indianapolis, IN: Addison-Wesley. 
3.  Gordon, L. A., & Loeb, M. P. (2006). Budgeting process for information security 
expenditures. Communications of the ACM, 49(1), 121-125. 
4.  Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2005). 2005 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey. San Francisco, CA: Computer Security Institute. 
5.  LeVeque, V. (2006). Information Security: A Strategic Approach. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Interscience. 
6.  Panko, R. R. (2004). Corporate Computer and Network Security. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
7.  Peltier, T. R. (2004). Information Security Policies and Procedures: A Practitioner's 
Reference (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications. 
8.  Ross, J. W., Weill, P., & Robertson, D. C. (2006). Enterprise Architecture as Strategy. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
9.  Simon, H. A. (1960). The New Science of Management Decision. New York, NY: Harper 
& Brothers Publishers. 
10.  Tudor, J. K. (2001). Information Security Architecture. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach 
Publications. 
11.  Weill, P., & Ross, J. W. (2004). IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision 
Rights for Superior Results. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 




CHAPTER 2 AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON IT 
GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATION SECURITY SERVICES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Information security (InfoSec) “is the protection of information and its critical elements, 
including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2005, p. 8).”  It is receiving greater attention recently, as the complexity of information 
systems, the sophistication of security attacks, and the legal and financial consequences of 
security breaches increase.  Another reason is tightened regulations.  For example, the enactment 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) raises the bar for accountability related to information security.  
To comply with SOX, public corporations need to manage information security to ensure that 
financial, transactional, and audit data are accurate, securely stored, free of corruption, protected 
from malicious access and modifications, and available for legitimate access (Symantec, 2004; 
Volonino, Gessner, and Kermis, 2004).  Failure to do so can result in prison terms and fines for 
top executives, primarily the CEO and the CFO. 
 
To protect business information, executives and business users rely on a number of information 
security services (Grance, Hash, Stevens, O'Neal, and Bartol, 2003).  For most firms, to date 
internal IT has been the primary provider of these services, as the results from various surveys 
show (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005, 2006; McKenna, 
2002).  If IT cannot provide effective information security services, the results can be costly, as 
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evidenced by SOX’s penalties for non-compliance.  This is because information security impacts 
not just IT but also every facet of an organization.  The board of directors and executive 
management, therefore, should take the lead in ensuring that information security is managed 
strategically.  The information security function should be directed and controlled with a proper 
governance framework (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2007). 
 
Information security governance is an integral part of IT governance (ITGI, 2006; Posthumus 
and von Solms, 2004; S. H. Von Solms, 2005).  A natural question to ask is: how do we 
implement IT governance so that IT is effective in providing information security services?  
However, to date, the question is still largely unanswered by both the academic and practitioner 
literature. 
 
Academic research on security governance largely follows the traditional centralized-
decentralized-federal trichotomy of governance forms (e.g.,Warkentin and Johnston, 2006a, 
2006b).  We have yet to see security governance addressed from the angle of dynamic 
governance mechanisms “such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams, 
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000, p. 106).”  The 
practitioner’s literature on this topic tends to adopt a “checklist” (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001) 
approach. 
 




Does implementation of various IT governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of 
information security services?  Which type(s) of mechanisms are more critical for improving 
information security? 
 
To answer this question, this essay presents a trio of governance mechanism types and uses 
agency theory to explain their efficacy in governing information security.  Agency theory is 
chosen as the theoretical basis because, in essence, the information security function acts as an 
agent and provides security services to business departments, the principal.  When agency 
problems occur, the principal’s welfare suffers.  In the context of information security, that 
means the principal’s information assets are not sufficiently protected and the principal receives 
suboptimal services.  The various IT governance mechanisms tackle the two root causes for 
agency problems: goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent.  This, in turn, leads to more effective information security services. 
 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows.  First, IT’s role as provider of information security 
services and effectiveness of InfoSec services are discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of 
agency relationship and agency problems in the context of information security function.  Next, 
IT governance and three types of governance mechanisms are presented.  The last section 
discusses how each type of these mechanisms can tackle the two root causes of agency problem 
hence increasing the effectiveness of information security services. 
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2.2 IT as InfoSec Service Provider 
This essay studies information security governance through the perspective that IT is the 
provider of information security service thus an agent for business users.  IT is a staff function 
that provides services to internal “customers” – other departments throughout the organization 
(Pitt, Watson, and Kavan, 1995).  It is particularly so when information security is concerned, 
because the outcomes of InfoSec activities fit the characteristics of services as described by 
Clark (1993): 
 
(a) Intangibility – InfoSec tasks do not usually produce physical goods.  Although some 
measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems often are implemented as 
hardware thus visible, the absence of security breaches, rather the hardware itself, is the 
true desired outcome; 
 
(b) Inseparability – InfoSec services are “sold” and then produced and consumed 
simultaneously.  The moment IT starts a protection measure, it is simultaneously used by 
the internal customers. 
 
(c) Heterogeneity – because of the enormous array of technological platforms, applications, 
data, threats, vulnerabilities, etc. and the variation in security personnel’s training and 
experiences, each instance of security service is unique; 
 
(d) Perishability – InfoSec service cannot be stored; and 
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(e) Non-transferability – When the service is rendered, there is no transfer of ownership. 
 
Furthermore, IT can be construed as providing a subcategory of service (Clark, 1993), one that 
adds value (security) to a tangible product (information assets).  IT implements security 
measures to protect both the information and the information systems on which information is 
stored (for conciseness, this essay uses the term “information security” to refer to the protection 
of both). 
 
IT provides a variety of information security services (Grance et al, 2003).  In its various special 
publications (e.g., Grance et al, 2003), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
suggests a wide range of InfoSec services that address the following three aspects of InfoSec 
protection: 
 
(a) Management – Services in this category aims to develop and maintain an organization-
wide security program, formulate security policies, design the security architecture, 
evaluate the effective security products, etc. 
 
(b) Operation – Services in this category handles important InfoSec operations such as 
contingency planning, incident response, security testing, user training, etc. 
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(c) Technical – Services in this category are most often associated with IT when information 
security is discussed, such as firewall configuration and management, intrusion detection 
system design and monitoring, public key infrastructure (PKI) implementation, etc. 
 
In theory, information security services can be offered by internal IT or external vendors (Grance 
et al, 2003).  In practice, however, industry surveys continuously show that only a very small 
percentage of firms actually outsource their information security services and, even then, usually 
only to a limited extent (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon et al, 2005, 2006; McKenna, 2002).  Thus, 
internal IT is the primary provider of a firm’s information security services. 
 
The information security function normally is rested upon the IT department or IT personnel.  Or 
it can be a separate security organization, which often reports to the CIO or head of IT (Gentile, 
Collette, and August, 2006).  This essay uses the terms “IT”, “information security function,” 
and “security organization” interchangeably to refer to the organizational unit or group that acts 
as the provider of information security services.  The terms “users,” “business,” and “user 
departments” refer to other organizational units, users, managers, and executives that depend on 
IT for protection of information assets. 
 
2.3 Effectiveness of Information Security Services 
The effectiveness of information security services is the extent to which the services are 
delivered successfully.  Its evaluation should have three focus points – business function, 
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customers, and effective security.  Thus, any metrics of effectiveness should include business 
impact, service delivery, and the efficacy of implementation (Grance et al, 2003). 
 
First, they ensure that the firm’s information assets are protected in terms of the widely accepted 
criteria of security that are commonly referred to as the confidentiality-integrity-availability 
(CIA) triad (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; B. Von Solms, 2005).  Each of the attributes in the 
CIA triad is defined as: 
 
(a) Confidentiality is the absence of unauthorized access, disclosure, and use of information 
(Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; Avižienis, Laprie, Randell, and Landwehr, 2004; Snedaker, 
2006; Wylder, 2004).   
 
(b) Integrity means that information is trustworthy and reliable because it has not been altered 
or corrupted by unauthorized users or computer processes (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; 
Avižienis et al, 2004; Snedaker, 2006; Wylder, 2004).  The unauthorized modification and 
corruption can be either accidental or malicious (Gollmann, 2006). 
 
(c) Availability is the authorized users’ ability to have timely and reliable access to information 
assets (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; Avižienis et al, 2004; Snedaker, 2006; Wylder, 2004).  
It is provided by fault-tolerant design and security measures preventing malicious attackers 
from blocking legitimate access (Gollmann, 2006).  Whereas confidentiality and integrity 
usually concerns information or data, the scope of availability is more encompassing.  It is 
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also pertinent to other information assets such as servers, Internet connection, networks, etc. 
(Snedaker, 2006). 
 
Second, an important measurement of IT’s effectiveness is the quality of service it provides (Pitt 
et al, 1995).  Along the same line, internal “customers” of InfoSec services expect IT to provide 
high quality services.  IT should deliver reliable services, be responsive to users’ service requests, 
be considerate with user requirements, perform services in a professional manner, etc.  It is 
suggested that quality is an important but overlooked aspect of information security (Snedaker, 
2006). 
 
Third, the security assurance provided by IT should support business users in their job function.  
The increasing importance of information security in fact reflects firms’ high reliance on reliable 
information.  Any security breaches affect the reliability of information hence users’ productivity. 
 
For information security services to be effective, ways are needed to ensure that IT performs 
them with diligence.  As “a theory of performance outcome (Nilakant, 1994 #103, p. 651,” 
agency theory often is used as the theoretic foundation for analyzing quality of service providers 
{e.g., Mills, 1990; Pontes, 1995; Singh and Sirdeshmukh, 2000).  Therefore, to explain how IT 
governance can improve InfoSec service effectiveness, this essay treats the relationship between 
IT and users as that between an agent (IT) and a principal (users).  Effectiveness is enhanced 
when agency problems are reduced.  IT governance is introduced as a means to achieve that end 
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because governance is considered instrumental to controlling agency problems (Baiman, 1990; 
Levinthal, 1988). 
 
2.4 Agency Relationship in Information Security 
When providing security services to the internal “customers,” the information security function 
in essence acts as an agent for the principal, i.e., the business departments.  An agency 
relationship is present whenever “one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).”  The principal delegates the 
task because of lack of time or ability to do the task (Nilakant and Rao, 1994).  Similarly, user 
departments need to delegate the provision of InfoSec services to IT because IT usually is the 
only organizational unit that has the expertise and skills for it. 
 
In an agency relationship, loss of principal’s welfare, or agency problems, often occurs.  In other 
words, the principal’s objectives may not be implemented in the principal’s best interest, due to 
two agency problems: adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection refers to the 
agent’s exerting the inappropriate type of effort (Nilakant and Rao, 1994).  In this situation, the 
principal is unable to determine the agent’s qualifications and abilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Levinthal, 1988) and whether the agent’s decisions and actions are in the principal’s best interest 
(Adams, 1994).  For example, a security administrator may dismiss abnormal activities on 
corporate network as transient peaks in traffic while the reality is that an attacker is scanning the 
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network.  Moral hazard means that the agent exercises inadequate effort.  In this situation, the 
principal is unable to verify the quantity and quality of the agent’s efforts (Mills, 1990).  As an 
example of moral hazard, a security administrator may dislike the mundane task of reviewing 
logs from firewalls, intrusion detection systems, Windows operating systems, etc.  She thus only 
performs a cursory daily review of the log entries and sometimes skips the review altogether.  In 
both adverse selection and moral hazard scenarios, it is unlikely that business managers would 
notice the security administrator’s suboptimal behaviors. 
 
Agency problems stem from goal incongruence between the agent and the principal and the 
principal’s difficulty in verifying the agent’s abilities and efforts due to asymmetric information 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Differences in training, experiences, work environment, and compensation 
structure all contribute to the agent having different objectives than the principal’s when tackling 
a task.  Goal incongruence between the agent and the principal can result in reduction in 
principal’s welfare (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). 
 
The difficulty in verification is mostly the result of information asymmetry.  Information 
asymmetry refers to the agent “having private information to which the principal cannot 
costlessly gain access.  This private information may be with respect to the agent’s action choice 
and/or state information (Baiman, 1990, p. 343).”  First of all, there is expertise-based 
asymmetry in that the agent possesses some domain knowledge, skills, and abilities that the 
principal lacks.  This asymmetry is in fact the raison d’être for agency relationships.  Also, as the 
agent works on the task, another type of asymmetry develops with respect to the knowledge 
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about the agent’s actions, resources needed for the tasks, the state of the task, etc. (cf., Arrow, 
1985; Baiman, 1990).  This can be termed performance-based asymmetry.  Expertise- and 
performance-based asymmetries afford the agent the ability to hide information and actions from 
the principal. 
 
Because of goal incongruence and information asymmetry, possibility always exists for the agent 
to act opportunistically.  Governance is necessary to control the agent’s behaviors that are not 
explicitly stipulated in the employment contract (Baiman, 1990).  Finance and accounting 
researchers have long focused on governance of the management (as shareholders’ agent) via 
compensation structure for the agent (e.g., Indjejikian, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Morgan 
and Poulsen, 2001; Yermack, 2004).  Management accounting literature primarily focuses on the 
reduction of information asymmetry through monitoring (Baiman, 1990).  Baiman (1982; 1990) 
proposes the creation, through monitoring, an “information system” that the principal can utilize 
to reduce the performance-based asymmetry and become more informed when evaluating and 
controlling the task outcomes.  This essay draws upon the IT governance literature for 
mechanisms that reduce goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and 
the principal. 
 
2.5 IT Governance 
As an integral part of the enterprise governance, IT governance is the organizational capacity to 
ensure that IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy.  IT Governance Institute (2003) 
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defines it as the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management.  De Haes and 
Van Grembergen (2004) extend it and suggest that IT management also should be involved in 
the process of governance. 
 
Research on IT governance has long focused on a trichotomy of organizing logic for IT decision 
making loci: centralization, decentralization, and federation, and on the antecedents that 
determines the selection of a particular organizing logic over others (Brown and Grant, 2005; 
Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000).  Of more practical importance and research interest, however, 
are the governance mechanisms “such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams, 
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000, p. 106).”  Thus, this essay 
studies various types of governance mechanisms rather than the traditional patterns such as 
centralization and decentralization.  The categorization of the governance mechanisms is based 
on the work by Peterson (2004), Van Grembergen and colleagues (De Haes and Van 
Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops, 2004), and Weill and Ross 
(2004). 
 
Process-based governance mechanisms are IT management techniques that ensure that daily 
behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in the effective 
management and use of IT (Weill and Ross, 2004).  It is the formal institution of strategic IT 
decision making or IT monitoring procedures.  With varying degrees of comprehensiveness, such 
standard procedures often are embedded in formalized decision-making methodologies and 
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management frameworks, e.g., IT investment approval process, balanced scorecard tools, cost-
benefit analysis, service level agreements, etc. 
 
An important function provided by process-based mechanisms is the monitoring and tracking of 
IT performance in terms of service delivery and business benefit realization (De Haes and Van 
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004; Van Grembergen et al, 2004; Weill and Ross, 2004).  
Examples include Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT), IT 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL), and ISO17799. 
 
A few process-based IT governance tools are available for organization to choose.  For 
compliance with SOX in terms of IT control, a de facto standard tool is the Control Objectives 
for Information and related Technology (CobiT), created by IT Governance Institute (ITGI, 
2000).  CobiT is computing platform agnostic and highly process focused.  It serves as a 
framework for evaluating security and controls over information (Kairab, 2005).  CobiT covers 
all IT-related processes with strong control over InfoSec-related activities in an organization.  
Out of the 54 control objectives in CobiT 3, 46 have detail control objectives (“sub-CO” of those 
54 higher level COs) related to InfoSec and are baselined.  Among other functionalities, CobiT 
ensures that specific responsibilities for the management of security is properly defined; that IT 
is properly staffed; that security are kept current and compliant with external regulations; that 
IT’s compliance of internal SLAs is regularly examined; that proper security procedures are 
being followed; and that the adequacy of security controls are regularly assessed (ITGI, 2004). 
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Another framework that has substantial adoption is the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL).  ITIL is 
also technology neutral and very focused on IT processes.  One of ITIL’s underpinnings is 
embedding InfoSec into everyday processes (Kairab, 2005). A more InfoSec-specific framework 
is the ISO17799, the international standard for information security management.  The ISO 
17799 is a high-level standard for different InfoSec aspects, which are grouped into ten major 
domains.  It stresses InfoSec best practices and can serve as a benchmark for security 
management (Kairab, 2005) 
 
Structural governance mechanisms are the organizational units and roles that are instituted to 
properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal connection between IT 
and business functions, and ultimately, to achieve their IT governance goals (Peterson, 2004; 
Peterson, O'Callaghan, and Ribbers, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).   
 
Formal groups such as executive teams, committees, councils, task forces are an important 
horizontal integration structures for coordinating IT decision making across business and IT.  
They may be formed temporarily on a task or can be instituted permanently as an overlay 
structure in the organization (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004). 
 
For instance, senior executive committees play a governance role in 90 percent of the 
organizations surveyed by Weill and Ross (2004).  When shared data and IT infrastructure is 
desired, organizations often form various types of committees whose membership typically 
includes the CEO, CFO, CIO, and heads of major business units.  The decision makers’ 
 31
combined expertise provides a holistic view that is beneficial to the governance goal – shared 
data and infrastructure.  For matters whose decision right typically falls upon IT, such as IT 
architecture, organizations with an IT leadership team or committee made up by corporate and 
business-unit IT leaders perform better than those without.  Linkages between business and IT 
can also be fostered with mechanisms such as joint decision councils (Weill and Ross, 2004). 
 
These structural mechanisms vary in their design and the degree to which they act as an advisory 
function or exercise formal decision-making authority (Peterson, 2004; Weill and Ross, 2004). 
 
Relational governance mechanisms are the organizational practices that encourage voluntary 
two-way communication and collaboration between business and IT (De Haes and Van 
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004; Van Grembergen et al, 2004).  
 
The major desired outcomes of such mechanisms are better mutual understanding and effective 
communication channels among the various stakeholders in the organization, such as corporate 
management, business unit management, IT management, among others (Peterson, 2004).  When 
business and IT understand each other’s perspectives, they can accurately interpret and anticipate 
others’ actions and coordinate adaptively.  Better understanding and collaboration lead to an 
integration of domain-specific expertise and tacit knowledge among people with different mental 
models, insights, and perspectives (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al, 2000). 
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Mechanisms that facilitate the mutual understanding and better communication among various 
stakeholders include direct (informal) contacts, lobbying, joint performance incentives and 
rewards, collocation of business and IT managers, cross-functional training, job rotations, 
continuous education, etc. 
 
2.6 Governance Mechanisms and Agency Problem Reduction 
IT governance holds the potential to improve InfoSec outcomes by tackling the two root causes 
of agency problems.  Reduction of the two root causes, in turn, leads to more effective InfoSec 
services. 
 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model 
 In this section, the three types of governance mechanisms are discussed with regard to two 
important activities that are critical to reducing goal incongruence and information asymmetry 
between IT and users.  The first activity is the definition of security requirements, which can be 
enhanced by service level agreements.  Clear definition of security requirements reduces the 
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incongruence in goals.  The second activity is security audit, which generates assessment and 
feedback information on the effectiveness of information security implementation.  In addition, 
mutually-agreed security requirements also provide a common language of communication, 
which aids the interpretation of results from security audits. 
 
2.6.1 Goal Congruence  
Goal congruence has been defined as the extent to which the relative importance of key 
performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992; Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001), including 
the achievability of goals (Jap, 1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003), are understood between/among 
parties.  For information security services, agreement on key performance criteria can be 
achieved through a well-implemented process of defining security requirements.  In addition, the 
most important criteria may be solidified in the form of service level agreements. 
 
Security requirements can be categorized into a three-tier structure (Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker, 
2006): business, functional, and technical requirements.  The business (or user) requirements are 
high-level statements that capture the essence of what InfoSec will achieve for the business 
(Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker, 2006).  Functional requirements are the characteristics that 
describe how an InfoSec solution or a system, when properly protected, meets the business 
requirements (Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker, 2006).  Business and functional requirements, once 
determined, become the basis for technical requirements.  Technical requirements are statements 
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of parameters or measurements that specify the InfoSec measures to be implemented (Snedaker, 
2006). 
 
Input from user departments is important to the processes of defining business and functional 
requirements.  Since they are the users of information assets, they have the best understanding of 
what needs to be protected and to what extent (ITSMF, 2005).  The process of soliciting business 
requirements thus often starts with user identifying the relevant information assets to protect 
(Alberts and Dorofee, 2003).  Asset/data classification is commonly used as the basis for 
determining the security requirements for information assets.  Proper users are assigned the 
stewardship of the asset and specify their security requirements (Wylder, 2004). 
 
After the business and functional requirements are defined, IT uses them as the basis and specify 
the technical requirements for information security.  After the technical requirements are defined, 
they serve as the yardstick by which IT evaluates the firm’s existing security baseline and 
decides what additional security measures need to be implemented (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; 
ITSMF, 2005). 
 
To ensure proper protection, technical requirements should support the functional requirements, 
which, in turn, should serve the business requirements properly (Snedaker, 2006).  In other 
words, the technical measures and operations IT implements should meet users’ specifications of 
desired results (functional requirements) and ultimately support users’ business needs (business 
requirements).  Therefore, for IT to provide quality InfoSec services to the users, it is essential 
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that IT and users obtain mutual understanding on what services IT should provide and what 
criteria to use for gauging IT’s effectiveness in providing the services.  Such understanding, in 
addition, may be formalized and articulated in service level agreements (SLAs). 
 
A service level agreement “is an agreement between the provider of a service and its customers 
which quantifies the minimum quality of service which meets the business need (Hiles, 1994, p. 
14).”  Besides the regular items to be seen in an agreement, e.g., parties to the agreement, 
administration, revision, etc., it defines: (a) what the service is, (b) specifics of the service such 
as timeframe and location within which it is rendered, (c) users’ expected level of service, (d) 
performance indicators, (e) constraints that delineate service attainability beyond which service 
levels are not guaranteed, and (f) reporting procedure and remedies for nonperformance (Larson, 
1998; Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003; Singleton, McLean, and Altman, 1988; Sturm, Morris, 
and Jander, 2000).  A key benefit of SLAs is that they clarify precisely what the customers’ 
needs are and which elements are the most important (Hiles, 1994).  Thus they establish a 
common language of communications for the parties involved and set mutually-agreed standards 
for measuring performance (Sturm et al, 2000).  These commonalities are even more important 
for the evaluation of qualitative aspects of IT (Singleton et al, 1988). 
 
In short, collaboration and communications between IT and user departments during the 
definition process of security requirements is essential to enhancing goal congruence between the 
two.  SLAs, if implemented, also promote goal congruence because they clearly define expected 
achievable service levels, goal attainability, and performance criteria. 
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2.6.1.1 Process-based mechanisms and goal congruence 
Process-based IT governance frameworks, techniques, and methodologies abound for firms to 
align the process of InfoSec planning with its business objectives, including capturing user 
security requirements correctly.  For instance, in CobiT 3’s Plan and Organize (PO) domain, 
Control Objectives PO1 governs the processes of identifying critical information and services 
and considering security requirements.  PO6 promotes consistent communication and regular 
discussion of the basic rules for implementing security requirements and responding to security 
incidents.  Quality management issues are covered in PO11.  Control objective DS1 in the 
Deliver and Support (DS) domain governs the various aspects of both in-house and external 
SLAs (ITGI, 2004; Lahti and Peterson, 2005).  In ITIL, SLAs are addressed as the first book  on 
the subject of Service Delivery.  Security Management is one of the major subjects in the ITIL 
library.  The Control process in Security Management stresses the importance of operational 
level agreement via the use of SLAs (ITSMF, 2005). 
 
Both CobiT and ITIL have a strong InfoSec focus.  Firms can also implement InfoSec-specific 
frameworks such as ISO17799 for InfoSec management or the OCTAVE method for security 
requirement determination.  Regardless of the specific mechanism(s) used and the degree of 
formality of SLAs, the key is that the mechanisms engender the process of establishing security 
requirements and service expectations between IT and users. 
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During this process, IT has the opportunity to discuss with users the technical feasibility or 
difficulty of fulfilling their security requirements, given the current state of security technologies 
and the firm’s resources.  The process also explicates both parties’ outlook and stance on risks.  
When an agreement is achieved, conflicts in expectations and risk stance should have been 
resolved or at least documented in a proviso.  The resultant expectations for security services 
thus are something IT will buy into.  Therefore, 
H1a: Process-based governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
2.6.1.2 Structural mechanisms and goal congruence 
In addition to the process-based mechanisms, various structural mechanisms also allow IT and 
business objectives and priorities to be discussed openly and formally.  Formal groups such as 
executive teams, committees, councils, and task forces are important structures for coordinating 
IT decision making across business and IT.  They may be formed temporarily on a task or 
instituted permanently as an overlay structure in the organization (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al, 
2000; Weill and Ross, 2004). 
 
Structural mechanisms such as IT steering committee, IT budget committee, IT strategy 
committee and similar organizational councils and committees are the venue in which IT and 
user departments present their cases and view points regarding information security.  Competing 
ideas and projects are debated and consensus is built.  In addition, formal liaison roles expedite 
communication between IT and users.  As the result, IT achieves a better understanding of users’ 
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requirements for InfoSec and is better prepared to devise security plans in accordance with such 
goals and priorities.  Therefore, 
H2a: Structural governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
2.6.1.3 Relational mechanisms and goal congruence 
People inside a firm interact with each other daily and spontaneous cooperative relationships 
develop as a by-product of seemingly random, uncontrollable actions.  Such voluntary 
relationships help people build network of contracts and communication channels that they can 
use for job performance.  With proper organizational practices, firms can consciously reduce the 
randomness and increase the chances that these voluntary contacts occur in pursuit of the firm’s 
goals (Galbraith, 1993).  They can implement relational mechanisms by encouraging or 
instituting practices that foster the relationship between IT and user departments.  These 
mechanisms are characterized by their participative and shared nature (Nilakant and Rao, 1994; 
Peterson, 2004).  Examples include direct (informal) contacts, lobbying, joint performance 
incentives and rewards, collocation of user departments and IT, cross-functional training, job 
rotations, etc.  Firms may also implement initiatives such as strategic dialogs (Nordblom, 2006) 
or relationship management (Martin, Hatzakis, Lycett, and Macredie, 2004).  Or they can be as 
simple as daily procedures and actions such as keeping each other updated of new developments 
in the department. 
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An amiable relationship between IT and business promotes better communications and 
understanding between the two.  In addition to positive effects on IT morale and motivation, 
these mechanisms also furnish IT with information about with whom to communicate and when 
communication with business departments is necessary.  These, in turn, encourage IT to be more 
interested in and sensitive to users’ security requirements.  They are also conducive to the 
creation of SLAs.  IT thus will have a better grasp of the users’ goals in terms of InfoSec 
protection and be more motivated to exercise efforts in delivering good service to user 
departments.  Therefore, 
H3a: Relational governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
2.6.2 Information Asymmetry 
An important way to reduce information asymmetry between the agent and the principal is 
monitoring (Adams, 1994; Baiman, 1990).  Monitoring of InfoSec effectiveness usually is 
performed through security assessments and IT audits. 
 
A security assessment is the process of determining whether the existing information security 
program is adequately addressing the firm’s security risks and is promptly updated for changes in 
business (Kairab, 2005; Snedaker, 2006). 
 
The scope of assessments can range from focused to comprehensive, depending on the situation.  
An example of the former is a vulnerability assessment.  Also termed “vulnerability scan,” it 
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identifies known vulnerabilities in the firm’s operating systems and system-level software.  
Analysis of vulnerability assessment results points to possible weakness in the IT infrastructure.  
The vulnerability assessment can be taken one step further by performing a penetration test, or 
“pen test” for short.  A pen test exploits the know vulnerabilities uncovered through the 
vulnerability scan and tries to penetrate systems and gain access to critical system files, functions, 
and information.  If such an attempt fails, the security measures in place are validated.  Finally, 
at the other end of the spectrum of testing scope, a comprehensive assessment can take the form 
of a risk assessment that considers more than just technical vulnerabilities but also security 
threats in the environment as well.  Vulnerability scan and pen test often are performed as part of 
the risk assessment.  Results from risk assessments contain a wealth of information about the 
security of the firm’s information and information systems (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002). 
 
An audit typically is less technical than an assessment but broader in scope (Kairab, 2005).  
Internal IT auditors usually start their audit with a system.  They try to decide the sensitivity of 
the information the system processes and the criticality of the system to the business operations.  
They then evaluate the types and sufficiency of security measures that are in place.  External 
audits are more comprehensive and often have the additional objective of validating policy or 
legal compliance (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002).  Audits may spot weak areas that prompt the 
firm to conduct a more technical security assessment. 
 
The difference between security assessments and audits is actually quite subtle (Kairab, 2005).  
For conciseness, the term “security audit” is used to refer to these monitoring methods 
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collectively.  Security audits can be performed by either internal auditors or a third party.  
Although self-assessments can be performed by IT itself, for unbiased opinions assessments also 
should be performed by external auditors and/or pen testers (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002).  
When executed properly, security audits enable the firm to obtain an independent view of 
security.  They uncover security risks and potentially raise issues about employee performance 
(Kairab, 2005).  Therefore, security audit is a very effective way to provide information on the 
outcomes of a firm’s security organization’s work.  As the result, the information asymmetry 
between IT and users is reduced. 
 
2.6.2.1 Process-based mechanisms and information asymmetry 
The benefits of implementing process-based mechanisms include the formalization of IT-related 
processes, standard language of communication, and metrics of IT performance.  All these 
facilitate the conducting of security audits. 
 
For example, CobiT groups IT processes into four “domains” covering the entire life cycle of IT 
process – Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor and 
Evaluate.  Each domain contains a number of “control objectives” that govern IT processes 
belonging in that domain.  Each control objective, in turn, is divided into a number of activities 
that are termed “detailed control objectives.”  CobiT distills a set of common, high-level 
information criteria.  The goals for each control objective are specified with regard to which of 
those criteria the control objective should fulfill, and to what extent.  It is notable that out of the 
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seven criteria three are for information security, i.e., the CIA triad.  To measure each process’ 
performance, ITGI also devises a system of metrics that include maturity models, critical success 
factors (CSFs), key goal indicators (KGIs), and key performance indicators (KPIs).  Maturity 
models allow the organization to benchmark each of its IT process against the industry, the 
international standards, or the organization’s strategic goal for that process.  The CSFs are the 
most important issues or actions that must be addressed successfully to be compliant with that 
control objective.  KGIs measure whether an IT process has achieved its business requirements.  
While KGIs measure the “what” of goal achievement, KPIs measure the “how” side – how well 
the process is utilizing resources toward the achievement of the goals (ITGI, 2004; Lahti and 
Peterson, 2005). 
 
Similarly, ITIL groups IT processes into a number of areas.  The guidance for improving the 
service quality of each is laid out in its corresponding publication.  ITIL’s governance 
framework is established by the collection, or “library,” of these publications (hence the “L” in 
ITIL).  These IT areas include: Business Perspectives, Service Management, Service Delivery, 
Service Support, ICT Infrastructure Management, Security Management, etc.  Within each, a 
number of subjects are addressed in more details.  The publications specify the objectives, 
activities, inputs, and outputs for processes categorized in each of these subjects (ITSMF, 2005).  
ISO17799, the international standard for information security best practices, groups InfoSec 
activities into ten domains, each containing a number of control objectives (Peltier, 2002). 
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What these frameworks try to capture, organize, and govern are really the same set of IT 
processes and services.  The differences between them are more a matter of organizing logic.  In 
fact, ITGI’s Security Baseline contains mappings between CobiT and ISO17799 control 
objectives.  More extensive mappings between Cobit, ISO17799, and ITIL are provided in 
Aligning CobiT, ITIL, and ISO17799 for Business Benefits. 
 
In summary, these process-based frameworks organize IT processes into a manageable number 
of control objectives.  This lends well to the checklist methodology that audits usually adopt.  
For instance, based on the CobiT system of organizing IT processes and metrics, ITGI also 
creates an Audit Guidelines for IT audits.  They enable the auditors to review specific IT 
processes that are most relevant to the audit purpose at hand.  In addition, these frameworks also 
create a common terminology inside the firm that makes interpretation and comparison of audit 
results much easier.  Therefore, 
H1b: Process governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and users. 
 
2.6.2.2 Structural mechanisms and information asymmetry 
Of particular importance are the structural mechanisms regarding security audits.  Proper 
implementation of structural mechanisms establishes an independent feedback channel and gives 
assurance to users regarding the quality of monitoring information (Jordan and Silcock, 2005). 
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Proper governance ensures that audit responsibilities are entrusted with the proper organizational 
unit that is impartial to the audit results.  An important mission of the audit committee is to 
ensure the independence of the audit function, which, ideally, should report directly to the audit 
committee.  Independence of the audit function allows auditors to be free from undue influence, 
monitor fairly, and serve the organization’s overall goals by focusing on the risks most critical to 
the business (Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003; Schweitzer, 1987; Straub, 1988).   
 
Also, a proper audit committee has representatives from every major group in the firm.  This 
helps to achieve adequate coverage of information security issues related to each of the groups 
(Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003). 
 
Therefore, structural governance mechanisms ensure proper composition and positioning of the 
audit function and audit committee.  As the result, the monitoring information gathered is most 
likely to be complete, impartial, and suitable to the firm’s business needs.  With this faithful 
audit information, users will be better informed of IT’s actions and the state of the organization’s 
information security.  Therefore, 
H2b: Structural governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and 
users. 
 
2.6.2.3 Relational mechanisms and information asymmetry 
Relational mechanisms enhance communication and understanding between IT and users.   
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With better understanding of IT staffers’ qualifications, work environment, the profession they 
are in, their risk stance, and their basic approach to problem solving qualifications, users are 
more informed when they interpret and evaluate security audit results. 
 
Both agency theory and signaling theory (Morris, 1987) suggest that the agent may be motivated 
to offer information to the principal to assure the latter of desirable results from the task.  Such 
information is beneficial to the principal even if there might be some “noise” created by the 
agent’s intentional shaping of the communication of that information (Levinthal, 1988).  A 
pleasant relationship motivates IT to have more interactions with business and be more willing to 
furnish users with information regarding IT’s qualifications for, approaches to, and actions in 
providing InfoSec services.   
 
For example, if IT staffers voluntarily seek and obtain industry certifications on information 
security, it provides users information on the staff’s capabilities that would otherwise be difficult 
to assess.  If IT initiates frequently communication regarding the firm’s current information 
security status, new information security threats likely to affect the organization, new trends in 
InfoSec defense measures, etc., users will feel not as uninformed when it comes to evaluate the 
IT’s performance.  The result of IT providing information like this is that users arrive in a 
position that is better able to evaluate IT’s technology provisioning, recommendations for 
information security services, and results from security audits.  Therefore, 




2.6.3 Governance and Effectiveness of InfoSec Services 
As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of InfoSec services include three aspects – quality service, 
asset protection, and business function support.  Addressing the root causes for agency problems 
enhances effectiveness in these aspects. 
 
Better understanding of “client” goals allows IT to better deliver the information, products, and 
services the client desires (Peak and Guynes, 2003).  Governance mechanisms improve the goal 
congruence between IT and the internal customers.  Part of the improvement comes from the 
rapport built between IT and business departments because one type of the governance 
mechanisms focuses on relationship building.  When IT understands users’ requirements with 
positive emotional predisposition, it is more willing to treat the users with better service and 
strives to seek out technical solutions, plan resources, and implement proper protection measures 
so that assets are better protected.  IT is also more willing to provide support the users on their 
job by providing InfoSec related services to help them fulfill operational, regulatory, and legal 
requirements so that they can perform better on their jobs.  Therefore, 
H4: Enhanced goal congruence between IT and users are positively related to higher 
effectiveness in InfoSec services provided by IT. 
 
On the other hand, reduction in information asymmetry makes the users much better “shopper” 
for services.  Suboptimal service quality is more likely to result in “customer complaints” which 
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can lead to corrective actions taken upon IT.  In extreme cases, it may lead to the outsourcing of 
the InfoSec function thus threatening IT’s job security.  Hence, IT will be more sensitive toward 
its service quality. 
 
Proper monitoring activities such as security assessments help to spot security vulnerabilities and 
loopholes and alert the firm in a timely manner.  Users thus are more informed of IT’s 
performance and security measures’ effectiveness in protecting information assets.  Remedy of 
the problems is more likely to take place promptly and results in better protection of assets.  Also, 
when evaluating users’ job performance, the information generated from monitoring helps to 
identify the impact caused by inadequate InfoSec services provided by IT.  This strengthens 
accountability and encourages IT to do their part to avoid the embarrassment of being traced 
down as the obstacle to users’ job performance.  Therefore, 
H5: Reduced information asymmetry between IT and users are positively related to higher 
effectiveness in InfoSec services provided by IT. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Organizations are implementing IT governance initiatives and investing heavily in information 
security.  Due to the nature of information security, in most organizations information security is 
implemented and managed primarily by the internal IT department.  In essence, IT acts as an 
agent for internal “customers” – the various business departments.  To ensure that IT provides 
the desired outcomes, i.e., best protection of information assets and quality services to business 
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departments, proper governance of the information security function is needed.  Information 
security governance is an integrated part of IT governance and can be implemented with a 
variety of IT governance mechanisms.  This essay delves into the rich array of governance 
mechanisms and presents them as a trio of process-based, structural, and relational mechanisms.  
It explains the efficacy of these mechanisms in guiding information security function toward 
more effective InfoSec services by adopting an agency theory perspective.  More specifically, it 
suggests that suboptimal outcomes occur when the agent does not act in the best interest of the 
principal, i.e., when agency problems occur.  The two root causes for agency problems are goal 
incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and the principal.  IT governance 
mechanisms help to reduce agency problems by addressing these two root causes.  In the context 
of information security, they work by facilitating better understanding of user requirements for 
information security and providing information feedback through objective assessment of the 
state of security in the organization.  These reduce the goal congruence and information 
asymmetry and lead to higher effectiveness in InfoSec services. 
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CHAPTER 3 EFFECTS OF IT GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON 




To protect business information, executives and business users rely on a number of information 
security (InfoSec) services (Grance, Hash, Stevens, O'Neal, and Bartol, 2003).  If the IT 
department cannot provide effective InfoSec services, the results can be costly.  Recently, there 
are calls for better governance of the information security function to ensure that it serves the 
company’s business needs (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004).  The board of directors and 
executive management, therefore, should take the lead in the implementation of a proper 
governance framework (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2007). 
 
Information security governance is an integral part of IT governance (ITGI, 2006; Posthumus 
and von Solms, 2004; Von Solms, 2005).  As such, it usually is implemented by taking 
advantage of broader, enterprise-wide IT governance mechanisms.  For instance, some 
governance function of InfoSec can be implemented as part of the implementation of Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT) or Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL).  In addition to these mechanisms that are IT process oriented, a 
variety of other governance mechanisms are available, with a focus on organizational structure or 
relationships.  These governance mechanisms, however, have not been sufficiently addressed in 
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academic research, which largely stresses the traditional centralized-decentralized-federal 
trichotomy of governance forms (e.g.,Warkentin and Johnston, 2006a, 2006b).  Thus, this study 
addresses these research questions: 
1. Does implementation of various IT governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of 
information security services?   
2. Which type(s) of mechanisms are more critical for improving information security? 
 
To understand these questions, we use agency theory to explain their efficacy in governing 
information security to explain the effectiveness of three types of governance mechanisms.  IT is 
viewed as an agent providing InfoSec services to the business departments, who are the 
principals.  The governance mechanisms are hypothesized to reduce goal incongruence and 
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal.  They, in turn, improve the 
effectiveness of InfoSec services. 
 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows.  First, the role of IT as a provider of information 
security services is discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of agency relationship and 
agency problems in the context of information security function.  Next, IT governance and three 
types of governance mechanisms are introduced.  We then present hypotheses on the 
relationships among (a) the governance mechanisms, (b) two root causes of agency problems, i.e., 
goal congruence and information asymmetry, and the (c) the effectiveness of InfoSec services.  
Next, we describe a survey of security managers and business managers for empirical testing of 
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those hypotheses.  Research findings are presented, followed by a discussion of those findings 
and the theoretical contribution.  Implications for future research also are discussed. 
 
3.2 Information Security Services 
IT is a staff function that provides services to internal “customers” – other departments 
throughout the organization (Pitt, Watson, and Kavan, 1995).  This is particularly true when it 
comes to information security.  The outcomes of InfoSec activities fit the characteristics of 
services as described by Clark (1993) – (a) intangibility: The outcomes of information security 
are usually intangible; (b) inseparability: InfoSec services are “sold” and “consumed” at the 
same time; (c) heterogeneity: each instance of InfoSec service is unique due to the differences in 
the user’s specific computer environment, the context of a security problem, and the IT staffer’s 
individuality; (d) perishability: InfoSec services cannot be stored; and (e) non-transferability: 
there is no transfer of ownership when InfoSec services are rendered. 
 
InfoSec services provided by IT address InfoSec at three levels – (a) management: developing 
and maintaining an organization-wide security program, formulating security policies, designing 
the security architecture, etc.; (b) operations: handling important InfoSec operations such as 
contingency planning, incident response, security testing, user training, etc.; and (c) Technical: 
technical implementation of InfoSec mechanisms, such as firewall configuration and 
management, intrusion detection system design and monitoring, public key infrastructure (PKI) 
implementation, etc. (Grance et al, 2003) 
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In theory, these services can be offered by internal IT or external vendors (Grance et al, 2003).  
In practice, however, industry surveys continuously show that only a very small percentage of 
firms actually outsource their information security services and, even then, usually only to a 
limited extent (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005, 2006; 
McKenna, 2002).  The information security function normally sits within an internal InfoSec 
function or IT department. 
 
Whether IT provides effective InfoSec should be evaluated in three areas – business function, 
customers, and effective security.  Any metrics of effectiveness should include efficacy of 
implementation, service delivery, and business impact (Grance et al, 2003). 
 
The efficacy of implementation is reflected in how services protects the safety of information 
assets.  Second, an important measurement of the effectiveness of IT is the quality of service it 
provides (Pitt et al, 1995).  IT should deliver reliable services, be responsive to user service 
requests, be considerate with user requirements, perform services in a professional manner, etc.  
Third, the security assurance provided by IT should support business users in their job functions. 
  
3.3 Agency Relationship in Information Security 
As the provider of security services to the internal “customers,” IT in essence acts as an agent for 
the principal, i.e., the business departments.  Agency relationships exist because the principal 
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delegates the task because of lack of time or ability to do the task (Nilakant and Rao, 1994), 
among other reasons.  Similarly, although business departments are the owner of information 
assets in the company, they need to delegate the provision of InfoSec services to IT because IT 
usually is the only organizational unit that has the expertise and skills for it. 
 
The downside to agency relationship is the loss of principal welfare, which is commonly referred 
to as two agency problems – (a) adverse selection refers to the agent’s exerting inappropriate 
types of effort (Nilakant and Rao, 1994).  For example, a security administrator may dismiss 
abnormal activities on corporate network as transient peaks in traffic while the reality is that an 
attacker is scanning the network; and (b) moral hazard means that the agent exercises inadequate 
effort (Mills, 1990).  A security administrator may dislike the mundane task of reviewing logs 
from firewalls, intrusion detection systems, Windows operating systems, etc.  In such cases, she 
thus only performs a cursory daily review of the log entries and sometimes skips the review 
altogether. 
 
Agency problems are the result of two fundamental causes – goal incongruence between the 
agent and the principal and the principal’s difficulty in verifying the agent’s abilities and efforts 
due to asymmetric information (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The difficulty in verification is mostly the 
result of information asymmetry.  Since, in many cases, the agent has the expertise the principal 
does not have and is directly involved in performing the task, the agent accumulates and 
possesses a wealth of information to which the principal cannot gain easy access.   
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Agency literature in fields such as accounting and finance has focused on governance as a way to 
control agency problems.  Often the goal is to use compensation structures to align managers’ 
(the agents’) interest with the principal’s (e.g., Indjejikian, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Morgan and Poulsen, 2001; Yermack, 2004) or to create, through monitoring, an “information 
system” that the principal can utilize to reduce the performance-based asymmetry (Baiman, 1982, 
1990).  However insightful this literature in accounting and finance is, this study draws upon the 
IT governance literature for mechanisms to reduce goal incongruence and information 
asymmetry between the agent and the principal. 
 
3.4 IT Governance Mechanisms 
IT governance is an integral part of corporate governance.  It is the organizational capacity to 
ensure that IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy (ITGI, 2003).  The extant IS 
literature on IT governance has long centered on decision making patterns that can be centralized, 
decentralized, or federal.  Of more practical importance and research interest, however, are the 
governance mechanisms such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams, 
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000).  Although some 
researchers have proposed three types of IT governance mechanisms (De Haes and Van 
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004a; Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops, 2004), much 
of this has been carried out at the theoretical level.  To the best of our knowledge, no empirical 
research in InfoSec literature has concentrated on governance mechanisms.  Therefore, we 
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explore three categories of IT governance mechanisms in this study, one basing on process, one 
on structure, and one on relations: 
 
1. Process-based governance mechanisms are IT management techniques that ensure that 
daily behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in 
the effective management and use of IT (Weill and Ross, 2004).  It is the formal 
institution of strategic IT decision making or IT monitoring procedures.  Examples 
include CobiT, ITIL, and ISO17799. 
 
2. Structural governance mechanisms are the organizational units and roles that are 
instituted to properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal 
connection between IT and business functions, and ultimately, to achieve IT governance 
goals (Peterson, 2004a; Peterson, O'Callaghan, and Ribbers, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).  
Formal groups such as executive teams, committees, councils, task forces are an 
important horizontal integration structures for coordinating IT decision making across 
business and IT.  These structures provide a holistic view that is beneficial to the 
governance goals.  Linkages between business and IT can also be fostered with 
mechanisms such as joint decision councils (Weill and Ross, 2004). 
 
3. Relational governance mechanisms are the organizational practices that encourage 
voluntary two-way communication and collaboration between business and IT (De Haes 
and Van Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004a; Van Grembergen et al, 2004).  The main 
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desired outcomes of such mechanisms are better mutual understanding and effective 
communication channels among the various stakeholders in the organization, such as 
corporate management, business unit management, IT management, among others 
(Peterson, 2004a).  Relational governance mechanisms include direct (informal) contacts, 
lobbying, joint performance incentives and rewards, collocation of business and IT 
managers, cross-functional training, job rotations, continuous education, etc. 
 
3.5 Governance Mechanisms and Agency Problem Reduction 
IT governance holds the potential to improve InfoSec outcomes by tackling the two underlying 
causes of agency problems.  Reduction of the two root causes, in turn, leads to more effective 
InfoSec services.  Figure 1 presents our theoretical model. 
 
Figure 3.1 Research Model 
The three types of governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of InfoSec services by 
addressing the underlying causes – goal incongruence and information asymmetry.  This study 
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addresses these relationships through a critical aspect of providing InfoSec service – gathering 
users’ requirements for security and assessing and monitoring of the fulfillment of those 
requirements. 
 
3.5.1 Goal congruence  
Goal congruence has been defined as the extent to which the relative importance of key 
performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992; Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001), including 
the achievability of goals (Jap, 1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003), are understood between/among 
parties.  For InfoSec services, agreement on key performance criteria can be achieved through a 
well-implemented process of defining security requirements.  IT should understand users’ high-
level business requirements, those that capture the essence of what InfoSec will achieve for the 
business, as well as functional requirements that describe how an InfoSec solution or a system, 
when properly protected, meets the business requirements.  Based on understanding of these 
requirements, IT can then derive specific technical requirements and implement the proper 
security mechanisms accordingly (Gentile, Collette, and August, 2006; Snedaker, 2006). 
 
In the process of requirement determination, collaboration and communications between IT and 
user departments is essential to enhancing goal congruence between the two.  Governance 
mechanisms promote such collaboration and communications. 
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When implementing process-based governance mechanisms, companies have to explicate their 
IT processes and organize them logically.  This can be seen in the CobiT model where IT 
processes are grouped into four broad areas and further subdivided into control objectives and 
detailed control objectives.  ISO17799 has a similar hierarchy that focuses exclusively on 
security-related processes. 
 
A benefit of implementing process-based mechanisms is that in the implementation process the 
company encourages IT and business departments to dialogue about IT processes and assets.  As 
the result IT gains a better understanding of what assets to protect in addition to the business and 
IT contexts for such protection.  IT can discuss with users the technical feasibility or difficulty of 
fulfilling their security requirements, given the current state of security technologies and the 
firm’s resources.  Therefore, 
H1a: Process-based governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
In addition to the process-based mechanisms, various structural mechanisms also allow IT and 
business objectives and priorities to be discussed openly and formally (Peterson, 2004a; Peterson 
et al, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).  Structural mechanisms such as IT steering committees, IT 
budget committees, and IT strategy committees and similar organizational councils and 
committees are the venue through which IT and user departments present their cases and 
viewpoints regarding information security.  Competing ideas and projects are debated and 
consensus is built.  As the result, IT achieves a better understanding of user requirements for 
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InfoSec and is better prepared to devise security plans in accordance with such goals and 
priorities.  Therefore, 
H2a: Structural governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
Relational governance mechanisms try to consciously catalyze the voluntary relationship 
building process employees experience every day.  Such voluntary relationships, in fact, are an 
important way by which employees build network of contracts and communication channels that 
they can use for job performance.  Relational governance mechanisms reduce the randomness 
and increase the chances that these voluntary contacts occur in pursuit of the firm’s goals 
(Galbraith, 1993).  As the result, a good relationship between IT and business promotes better 
communications and understanding between the two and encourage IT to be more interested in 
and sensitive to user security requirements.  Therefore, 
H3a: Relational governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users. 
 
3.5.2 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is the second underlying cause of agency problems.  Reduction of 
information asymmetry is achieved primarily by creating an “information system” of monitoring 
information (Adams, 1994; Baiman, 1990).  Monitoring of InfoSec effectiveness usually is 
performed through security assessments and IT audits.   
A security assessment is the process of determining whether the existing information security 
program is adequately addressing the firm’s security risks and is promptly updated for changes in 
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business (Kairab, 2005; Snedaker, 2006).  Depending on a company’s specific needs, the scope 
of assessment can go from a simple network scanning to penetration testing.  Or the assessment 
can be performed with more technical focus such as a penetration test or with more business 
focus in the form of a risk assessment.  Under certain circumstances, intensive and purposive 
assessment in the form of a formal audit can be performed (Kairab, 2005; Maiwald and Sieglein, 
2002).  Security assessments inform business users and top management of what IT is doing to 
protect information assets and how they are performing in that respect.  Governance mechanisms 
help to reduce the information asymmetry by implementing a process to ensure regular security 
assessments and assessment results that are objective and comprehensible to the principal. 
 
Process-based mechanisms help companies to organize IT processes into a manageable number 
of control objectives.  The benefits include formalization of IT processes, standard language of 
communication, and usable metrics of IT performance.  These fit well with the checklist 
methodology that audits usually adopt.  For instance, based on the CobiT system of organizing 
IT processes and metrics, ITGI has also created an Audit Guidelines for IT audits.  They enable 
the auditors to review specific IT processes that are most relevant to the audit purpose at hand.  
In addition, these frameworks also create a common terminology inside the firm that makes 
interpretation and comparison of audit results much easier.  Therefore,  
H1b: Process governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and users. 
 
Proper implementation of structural mechanisms establishes an independent feedback channel 
and assures users high quality feedback (monitoring) information (Jordan and Silcock, 2005).  
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For instance, an important mission of the audit committee is to ensure the independence of the IS 
audit function, which, ideally, should report directly to the audit committee.  Independence of the 
audit function allows auditors to be free from undue influence, monitor fairly, and serve the 
organization’s overall goals by focusing on the risks most critical to the business (Rittinghouse 
and Hancock, 2003; Schweitzer, 1987; Straub, 1988).  Also, if the committee has representatives 
from every major group in the firm, adequate coverage of information security issues related to 
each of the groups is ensured (Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003).  As the result, the monitoring 
information gathered is most likely to be complete, impartial, and suitable to the firm’s business 
needs.  With this faithful audit information, users will be better informed of actions by the IT 
group and the state of organizational information security.  Therefore, 
H2b: Structural governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and 
users. 
 
Relational mechanisms enhance communication and understanding between IT and users.   
With better understanding of IT staffers’ qualifications, their work environment, their profession, 
their risk stance, and their basic approach to problem solving qualifications, users are better 
informed to interpret and evaluate security audit results.  A good relationship motivates IT to 
have more interactions with business units and be more willing to furnish users with information 
regarding the qualifications of IT personnel and IT’s  approaches to and actions for providing 
InfoSec services.  The result of IT providing information like this is that users arrive in a position 
that is better able to evaluate the technology provisioning of the IT group, its recommendations 
for information security services, and results of security audits.  Therefore, 
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H3b: Relational governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and 
users. 
 
3.5.3 Governance and Effectiveness of InfoSec Services 
Governance mechanisms improve the goal congruence between IT and the internal customers.  
Better understanding of “client” goals allows IT to better deliver the information, products, and 
services the client desires (Peak and Guynes, 2003).  When IT approaches user requirements 
with a positive predisposition, it is more willing to respond to the users with better services and 
seek out technical solutions, plan resources, and implement proper protection measures so that 
assets are better protected.  IT is also more willing to support users on their job by providing 
InfoSec related services to help them fulfill operational, regulatory, and legal requirements.  
Therefore, 
H4: Goal congruence between IT and users are positively related to effective InfoSec services. 
 
With reduction in information asymmetry, suboptimal service quality is more likely to result in 
“customer complaints” which can lead to IT being “corrected” by management.  Proper 
monitoring activities such as security assessments help to spot security vulnerabilities and 
loopholes and alert the management in a timely manner.  Users thus are more informed of IT’s 
performance and the effectiveness of security measures in protecting information assets.  
Remedy of the problems is more likely to take place promptly and results in better protection of 
assets.  Also, when evaluating user job performance, the information generated from monitoring 
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helps to identify the impact caused by inadequate InfoSec services provided by IT.  This 
strengthens accountability and encourages IT to do their part to avoid the embarrassment of 
being traced down as the obstacle to user job performance.  Therefore, 
H5: Information asymmetry between IT and users are negatively related to higher effectiveness 
in InfoSec services. 
 
3.6 Methodology 
To test our research model, a survey was conducted with information security managers.  Since 
there are no existing scales for the constructs in the model, we developed various items for the 
constructs.  Following methods suggested by Dillman (2000), Mangione (1995), and Sivo et al. 
(Sivo, Saunders, Chang, and Jiang, 2006), paper questionnaires containing those items were 
distributed and online versions created.  A few sources were solicited for responses.  In total 102 
responses were received and used for data analysis. 
 
3.6.1 Operationalization of Constructs 
Because current research on the three governance mechanisms remains largely on the conceptual 
level, we had to create items to measure the implementation of the three types of governance 
mechanisms, specifically in the context of information security.  The items for governance 
mechanisms were derived from academic and practitioner literature on IT governance, in 
particular, Lahti and Peterson (2005), ITSMF (2005), Van Grembergen (2004), and Galbraith 
(1993), as well as information gathered from the domain experts and conferences. 
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The process-based mechanisms were operationalized with regard to the extraction of information 
security requirements and security assessments.  Items were designed to ask whether security 
requirements were effectively extracted and implemented.  To avoid bias toward any particular 
governance framework such as CobiT, ITIL, or ISO17799, the items captured the key controls 
that all frameworks try to achieve, rather than using the terminology specific to a particular 
framework. 
 
For structural governance mechanisms, items were created to ask about the formal 
organizational units and roles that oversee the information security function and security audits.  
With respect to the success of  implementation, these questions ask about the various committees 
and roles, such as IT steering committee, information security, security audit committee, etc. 
 
Since relational governance mechanisms foster better communication between IT and business 
departments in the company, these items were created to measure whether and how a company 
implements various methods to encourage the interaction between IT and business users. 
 
Measures of goal congruence were based on the definition of this construct as the extent to 
which the relative importance of key performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992; 
Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001) is understood between/among parties.  Therefore, the 
measures for goal congruence between IT and user departments were based on information from 
ITSMF (2005) and Gopal, Krishnan, Mukhopadhyay, and Goldenson (2002). 
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Given that information asymmetry occurs when the agent has private information to which the 
principal cannot costlessly gain access  items were created with this in mind for the context of 
this study.  One source for this was Gallouj (1997), who theorizes on aspects of information 
asymmetry.   
 
To measure the effectiveness of InfoSec services, self-report measures were used.  This is largely 
due to (a) the intangibility nature of outcomes from InfoSec services, and (b) the sensitive nature 
of questionnaire on InfoSec.  First, measuring the effectiveness of InfoSec services is inherently 
difficult due to the intangible nature of the outcomes from the services.  A company usually 
benefits from the InfoSec services through mitigation of risks (Purser, 2004).  While other 
organizational investments can be assessed by tangible financial returns, it is very difficult, if at 
all possible, to calculate expected financial returns from InfoSec investments (Newman and 
Scholtz, 2003). 
 
Theoretically, the effectiveness of InfoSec services could be measured by summary results from 
security assessments an organization has performed.  However, it is highly unlikely that 
respondents will be able to answer such requests.  In fact, asking sensitive questions in an 
InfoSec-related questionnaire can prevent recipients from returning the questionnaire, as argued 
by Kutolic and Clark (2003). 
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Effectiveness of InfoSec services thus has been operationalized as three items asking the 
respondent to estimate top management satisfaction with InfoSec services. 
 
3.6.2 Development of Instrument 
There are no existing instruments for constructs in the research model.  Thus, an instrument was 
created.  A group of domain experts consisting of information security and IT audit practitioners 
in the field were asked to help in the process of instrument development and validation.  As the 
first step of the instrument development, an initial pool of items was generated based on review 
of the extant literature, discussion with the domain experts, and information and input that we 
gathered while attending various practitioner conventions on information security and IS audit. 
 
The candidate items in the initial pool were then put through four rounds of Q-sort modeled after 
Moore and Benbasat (1991).  A different group of four people served as judges in each round.  
For the first and second rounds, the judge included a practitioner expert, two Ph.D. students in 
the IS field, and a Ph.D. student in a non-IS field.  For the third and four rounds, they were a 
practitioner expert, an IS Ph.D. student, and two non-IS Ph.D. students. 
 
In the first round, we did not provide constructs and their definitions to the judges.  We asked 
them to sort the items that they believed should load on the same constructs together and provide 
their definition of the constructs.  If the judge found any items that were ambiguous or 
problematic, they were asked to discuss them with us. 
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In the second round, the judges had the constructs and their definitions and sorted each item into 
the construct to which they believed the item belonged.  Again, ambiguous and problematic 
items were discussed. 
 
Based on the results from the first two rounds, we revised the items and put them through 
another two rounds of Q-sort.  The third round was identical to the first round but conducted with 
a different group of judges.  Similarly, the fourth round was the same as the second round except 
the judges.  After these four rounds of Q-sort, 45 items were generated for the six constructs. 
 
Since the security managers usually have more detailed, first-hand knowledge about what and 
how IT governance mechanisms are implemented in an organization, we collected answers from 
them.  For items about goal congruence, information asymmetry, and effectiveness of InfoSec 
services, we also obtained, in addition to security managers’ responses, answers from their 
supervisors or representative business users as well.  Thus the security manager answers could be 
compared to business manager answers to evaluate objectivity.  Therefore, another set of similar 
items for business managers were also created and Q-sorted. 
 
The items were organized into two draft questionnaires – a security manager version and a 
business manager version.  The business version was pre-tested with graduate students in two 
master-level MIS classes for format, wording, and time required to complete.  We then pre-tested 
the security manager version at a monthly meeting of the local chapter of the Information 
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Systems Security Association (ISSA) with 12 security managers.  The managers were also asked 
to bring the business version back to their company and ask their supervisor to fill them out.  
Four business manager versions were returned.  Feedback from the pre-tests was used to revise 
the questionnaires both in content and format. 
 
3.6.3 Survey Administration 
The recipients of the paper questionnaire were primarily IT leaders in the 2006 InformationWeek 
500 (IW500) organizations.  Each year, the InformationWeek magazine publishes a list of 500 
organizations that are considered savvy technology users.  Since the publicly available list 
includes the name and job title of IT leaders in those organizations, it is a convenient sample for 
researchers to contact IT leaders.  For example, for their study on InfoSec budgeting process, 
Gordon et al (2006) surveyed IW500 companies on a previous year’s list.  This study uses the 
most up-to-date list at the time of the survey administration.  After excluding organizations that 
are not based in the U.S. and those organizations whose IT leader information or mailing address 
was not available, questionnaires were mailed to 425 organizations. 
 
The paper questionnaire administration largely followed the process as laid out by Dillman 
(2000), Mangione (1995), and Sivo et al (2006).  Four contacts were made with the recipients at 
various points in time: (a) a pre-notice letter notifying the recipients of the upcoming 
questionnaire; (b) the complete survey packet; (c) a follow-up postcard to remind the recipient; 
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and (d) a second follow-up letter that was accompanied by a replacement questionnaire.  These 
contacts occurred during the period from the middle of May through late July, 2007. 
 
The questionnaire packet included both a security manager and business manager version.  The 
former was used to collect responses from security managers, who were defined as the person in 
charge of managing the InfoSec function.  The latter was targeted at the security manager’s 
supervisors, which were referred to as “business managers” and could include CIO, 
Executive/Senior VP, CFO, COO, CEO, etc.  Since the  IT leaders listed in the IW500 list all 
were in the “business manager” category, the cover letter asked them to fill out the business 
manager version and then forward the other questionnaire to the security manager in their 
organizations.  The other materials in the packet included, for each version, the IRB-approved 
informed consent letter, instruction sheet, a notification postcard, and a business reply mail 
(BRM) return envelope.  Except the return envelopes, the materials for each version were printed 
on a distinct color, color-matched, and pinned together. 
 
The respondents’ anonymity was strictly protected.  Both versions of the questionnaire were 
anonymous.  They had demographic questions that the respondents could optionally answer but 
did not ask about the identity of the respondents or the companies they worked for.  Each 
questionnaire had a pre-stamped sequence number but it was exclusively for matching up the 
returned questionnaires from the security manager and business manager in the same company.  
No individual sequence numbers were recorded and tied to any companies.  The notification 
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postcards allowed the respondents to inform the researchers only that they had returned the 
questionnaire. 
 
In addition, several other sources of potential respondents were tapped.  These sources were 
members of two professional organizations – Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA) and Information Systems Security Association (ISSA).  To survey these 
groups, an online version of the paper questionnaire was created.  The ISACA headquarters 
included the survey in its Academic Advocate initiative and sent out the URL to its contact list of 
information security managers.  Two local ISACA chapters sent out email to their members and 
solicited participation in the online survey.  A local ISSA chapter also encouraged its members to 
participate.  In addition, members of the advisory boards of two universities were asked to 
participate. 
 
At the conclusion of the survey, altogether 102 security manager responses were collected.  Out 
of these, 53 responses were collected online and 49 were paper-based.  Fifty-three business 
manager responses (13 online, 40 paper-based) were collected.  Between the security manager 
and business manager responses, 38 pairs were matched.  The job titles of security managers are 
listed in Table 3.1 and the industries they represented are listed in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Job Titles of Respondents (Security Managers) 
Job Title Respondents 
Chief Information Officer 6 
Chief Information Security Officer 21 
Chief Security Officer 5 
IT Director 13 
Security Director 4 
Security Manager 23 
Security Specialist (Security analyst, architect, engineer, trainer, etc.) 21 




Table 3.2 Industry of Respondents (Security Managers) 
Industry Respondents 
Automotive 1 
Banking and Financial Services 15 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals 2 
Chemicals 1 
Consulting 7 
Consumer Goods 1 
Distribution 1 
Energy and Utilities 2 
Health Care and Medical 6 
Hospitality and Travel 2 
Information Technology 7 
Insurance 5 
Logistics and Transportation 2 
Manufacturing 5 
Media and Entertainment 2 
Metal and Natural Resources 1 
Retail: General Merchandising 2 
Retail: Specialty Merchandising 1 
Telecommunications 3 
Education 4 
Public Sector 8 




3.7 Data Analyses 
Partial Least Square (PLS) is used to analyze the data.  We use PLS because PLS is more 
suitable for theory building and exploratory studies (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000) and 
there are formative constructs in the model (Petter, Straub, and Rai, 2007).  In particular, 
SmartPLS (Temme, Kreis, and Hildebrandt, 2006) was used. 
 
Since the instrument was created for this study and no pre-existing scales were used, the first 
stage of data analysis was to validate the items in the instrument.  Three of the six new constructs 
are reflective and the other three are formative. 
 
3.7.1 Content Validity 
Content validity is the extent to which items represent all of the ways that could be used to 
measure of the content of a given construct (Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen, 2004).  Content 
validity is not easy to assess and is established with literature reviews and expert judges.  It is 
highly recommended but not mandatory for IS studies (Straub et al, 2004).  For this study, we 
examined content validity during the process of the four rounds of Q-sorts and via discussion 
with domain experts. 
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3.7.2 Construct Validity 
Construct validity assesses whether the items designed for a construct really measure what they 
are supposed to measure.  It is typically evaluated by convergent validity and discriminant 
validity.   
 
3.7.2.1 Convergent Validity Test with PCA 
When convergent validity is good, indicators for the same construct are more correlated with one 
another than with any other indicators for other constructs.  For reflective constructs, indicators 
should be highly correlated and interchangeable.  Purging of problematic indicators is 
recommended (Petter et al, 2007).  Convergent validity can be established using factor analytic 
techniques such as PCA, confirmatory factor analysis, etc. (Straub et al, 2004).  After cross-
loading items are dropped, indicators should load cleanly on their respective constructs.  In 
comparison, indicators for a formative construct measure different aspects of the construct and 
thus may not correlate with each other closely.  Convergent validity of formative indicators, 
therefore, are established using conceptual methods such as Q-sorts (Petter et al, 2007).   
 
Since constructs in various causal stage (independent variables, mediators, or dependent 
variables) by design are correlated, indicators of constructs in different causal stages could cross 
load or result in poor loadings for constructs that were otherwise valid.  Thus, Straub et al (2004) 
recommend that factorial validity examines the constructs independent of the theoretical 
connections.  In other words, it is best not to mix IVs and DVs in factoring. 
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Following this advice, we perform a PCA on the 24 items that are intended to measure the three 
independent variables: process-based governance mechanisms (PG), structural governance 
mechanisms (SG), and relational governance mechanisms (RG).  Kaiser’s criterion is used to 
extract all factors with a eigenvalue greater than 1.  The solution is rotated orthogonally with 
Varimax rotation.  Although six factors are extracted in the first run, the scree plot clearly 
(Figure 3.2) shows that in fact three factors are a more appropriate number to extract.   
 
Figure 3.2 Scree Plot from First Principal Component Analysis 
 
This is in agreement with the fact that these 24 items are designed to measure three constructs.  
After the items loading on multiple or unintended constructs were dropped, the final solution 
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retained five indicators for PG, four items for SG, and four items for RG.  The loadings of the 
items are listed in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 Item Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (Independent Variables) 
Factor  
  
PG SG RG 
PG1POL .796 .076 .205
PG2STD .834 .101 .080
PG4RKA .642 .311 .302
PG6CHG .658 .252 .188
PG8EAU .707 .223 .022
SG1STR .183 .505 .488
SG3BGT .079 .638 .072
SG4ACA .280 .861 .181
SG5ACB .255 .851 .134
RG3EVT .420 .025 .661
RG4XFT .273 .298 .723
RG5COL .008 .052 .797
RG6CCY .100 .179 .859
 
Factors extracted with Keiser’s criterion of eignevalue greater than 1. 
Rotation method: Varimax. 
 
 
When evaluating the loadings, for a sample size of 100, .512 is recommended (Field, 2005; 
Stevens, 2002).  All the items retained, except SG1STR, load on their related constructs with 
loadings substantially higher than .512.  SG1STR also loads high on RG.  However, since it is an 
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important type of structural governance mechanisms, we retain it tentatively, pending further 
validation. 
 
There are a few other statistics used to evaluate the appropriateness of the final rotated solution.  
Although a certain degree of multicollinearity is in fact necessary for factor analysis, excessive 
multicollinearity lessens the distinction between factors.  The R-matrix of the final solution has a 
determinant of .001, signifying a sufficient but not excessive level of multicollinearity.  The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic is .808.  A KMO value above .8 is considered very good 
and indicates a high likelihood that the factor analysis yields distinct and reliable factors.  The 
measures of sampling adequacy (MSAs) are all above the .5 acceptable level, with many of them 
above .8, a level that is considered meritorious (Field, 2005; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 
1998).  Table 3.4 lists the communalities and MSAs for the final solution for the independent 
variables. 
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Table 3.4 Communalities and MSA for Final Rotation (Independent Variables)  















The dependent variable, effectiveness of InfoSec services (ES), is a reflective construct.  Another 
PCA is performed on the items for the endogenous variables.  Again, the items demonstrate high 
loadings on the ES construct (See Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5 Item Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (Dependent Variables)  
Component 
 
GC IA ES 
GC1WHA .824 .066 .180
GC2WHO .861 .062 .190
GC3PRI .881 -.031 .211
GC4RSC .771 .038 .299
GC5FSB .863 .054 .275
GC6EXP .836 .138 .069
GC7MTR .760 -.046 .129
IA1CMP .076 .807 .115
IA2EXP .061 .828 .137
IA3ACT .041 .877 .040
IA4EFT -.002 .821 -.011
IA5QUL .013 .843 .059
IA6RND .034 .688 .140
ES1SRV .403 .144 .777
ES2PTN .259 .108 .810
ES3SUP .282 .173 .880
 
For formative constructs such as goal congruence and information asymmetry (IA), high 
loadings for all indicators are not absolutely necessary (Petter et al, 2007).  Therefore, we also 
retain the items for GC and IA for further validation.  Thus, 29 items are retained.  These items, 
as well as the complete wording for the items, are listed in Table 3.6.  Their means and standard 
deviations are listed in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.6 Retained Items and Complete Wording  
Code Item 
Process-based Governance Mechanisms 
PG1POL In my company, users’ requirements for information security are addressed in information 
security policies. 
PG2STD In my company, users’ requirements for information security are addressed in information 
security standards. 
PG4RKA In my company, risk assessment is performed before information security services are 
planned. 
PG6CHG In my company, proper change management procedures are followed when information 
security plans are updated for changes in user requirements for information security. 
PG8EAU In my company, external IS audits are performed regularly by accounting firms, contractors, 
etc. 
Structural Governance Mechanisms 
SG1STR In my company, the IT steering committee (or its equivalent) is effective in deciding strategic 
IT matters. 
SG3BGT In my company, the IT budget committee (or its equivalent) is effective in overseeing IT 
budget matters. 
SG4ACA In my company, the IS audit committee (or its equivalent) is effective in overseeing IS audit 
matters. 
SG5ACB In my company, the IS audit committee (or its equivalent) is composed of members with 
backgrounds in various business functions. 
Relational Governance Mechanisms 
RG3EVT My company often sponsors events where we (security organization) interact with employees 
in other departments. 
RG4XFT My company implements cross-functional training between us (security organization) and 
other departments. 
RG5COL My company physically locates our offices so that we (security organization) have maximum 
interaction with employees in important departments. 
RG6CCY My company Encourages us (security organization) and other departments to cc each other, 






GC1WHA In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on What information assets to protect. 
GC2WHO In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on who in the security organization implements which security mechanisms. 
GC3PRI In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on the priorities of information security. 
GC4RSC In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on the allocation of resources for information security. 
GC5FSB In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on the feasibility of implementing information security services. 
GC6EXP In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on the expected results for information security. 
GC7MTR In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus 
on the metrics to define the success of information security. 
Information Asymmetry 
IA1CMP In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about The precise level of our own competence in implementing information security 
mechanisms. 
IA2EXP In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about the precise level of our own experience in implementing information security 
mechanisms. 
IA3ACT In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about what we (security organization) are doing to protect information assets. 
IA4EFT In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about the amount of effort we (security organization) are exerting. 
IA5QUL In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about the quality of services we (security organization) provide to protect information assets. 
IA6RND In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do 
about the random, external factors that may influence our effectiveness in protecting 
information assets. 
Effectiveness of InfoSec Services 
ES1SRV In my company, top management, in general, is satisfied with the services provided by us 
(security organization) to protect information assets. 
ES2PTN In my company, top management, in general, is confident that information assets are well 
protected. 
ES3SUP In my company, top management, in general, feels that the level of information security 
supports its jobs well. 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics 
Item Mean Std. Deviation 
PG1POL 3.88 1.163 
PG2STD 3.60 1.137 
PG4RKA 3.06 1.209 
PG6CHG 3.43 1.231 
PG8EAU 3.92 1.272 
  
SG1STR 3.31 1.398 
SG3BGT 2.90 1.592 
SG4ACA 2.32 1.889 
SG5ACB 2.23 1.825 
  
RG3EVT 2.56 1.271 
RG4XFT 2.61 1.204 
RG5COL 2.86 1.365 
RG6CCY 3.34 1.294 
  
GC1WHA 3.51 1.174 
GC2WHO 3.67 1.127 
GC3PRI 3.42 1.188 
GC4RSC 3.00 1.135 
GC5FSB 3.16 1.132 
GC6EXP 3.38 1.217 
GC7MTR 2.91 1.228 
  
IA1CMP 3.98 .832 
IA2EXP 4.04 .922 
IA3ACT 3.88 .915 
IA4EFT 3.82 .999 
IA5QUL 3.69 .931 
IA6RND 3.87 .951 
  
ES1SRV 3.75 .927 
ES2PTN 3.72 .924 




After the exploratory factor analysis, and the retaining of 16 items for PG, SG, RG, and ES, and 
13 items for GC and IA, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using PLS to validate the 
convergent and discriminant validity of the items.  In a PLS model, each item is designated to 
load on the construct that it measures.  Then the measurement and structural model are estimated 
using the PLS algorithm.  As standard in PLS analysis, bootstrap samples are then generated to 
estimate the significance of item loadings and path coefficients. 
 
3.7.2.2 Convergent Validity Test with PLS 
Items show convergent validity when they load with significant t-values on its construct and at 
least the .05 significance level is desired (Gefen and Straub, 2005).  For this study, the retained 
items and the constructs they load on, as well as the corresponding t-values, are listed in Table 
3.8.  As can be deduced from the table, all these loadings are at the .001 significance level. 
 
3.7.2.3 Discriminant Validity Test with PLS 
To test the discriminant validity of the items, first we examine the item loadings on the 
constructs.  Table 3.9 shows the loadings of each item on each of the constructs.  
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Table 3.8 Significance of Item Loadings  






Error T Statistic 
PG1POL PG 0.7968 0.7962 0.0402 0.0402 19.8307 
PG2STD PG 0.8048 0.7921 0.0619 0.0619 13.0080 
PG4RKA PG 0.7894 0.7821 0.0532 0.0532 14.8349 
PG6CHG PG 0.7670 0.7793 0.0413 0.0413 18.5746 
PG8EAU PG 0.7144 0.7140 0.0624 0.0624 11.4572 
       
SG1STR SG 0.7693 0.7473 0.0566 0.0566 13.5852 
SG3BGT SG 0.5841 0.5863 0.1133 0.1133 5.1558 
SG4ACA SG 0.8939 0.8991 0.0347 0.0347 25.7700 
SG5ACB SG 0.8490 0.8550 0.0528 0.0528 16.0873 
       
RG3EVT RG 0.7662 0.7692 0.0616 0.0616 12.4445 
RG4XFT RG 0.8516 0.8517 0.0305 0.0305 27.9532 
RG5COL RG 0.7421 0.7411 0.0637 0.0637 11.6595 
RG6CCY RG 0.8693 0.8703 0.0215 0.0215 40.3861 
       
GC1WHA GC 0.8125 0.7834 0.0689 0.0689 11.7953 
GC2WHO GC 0.8478 0.8286 0.0689 0.0689 12.2964 
GC3PRI GC 0.9072 0.8785 0.0422 0.0422 21.4780 
GC4RSC GC 0.8330 0.8035 0.0659 0.0659 12.6434 
GC5FSB GC 0.9592 0.9284 0.0389 0.0389 24.6482 
GC6EXP GC 0.8088 0.8014 0.1052 0.1052 7.6880 
GC7MTR GC 0.6883 0.6829 0.0916 0.0916 7.5163 
       
IA1CMP IA 0.7850 0.5665 0.2634 0.2634 2.9798 
IA2EXP IA 0.7832 0.5932 0.2588 0.2588 3.0263 
IA3ACT IA 0.6715 0.4712 0.2691 0.2691 2.4958 
IA4EFT IA 0.3876 0.3528 0.2568 0.2568 1.5093 
IA5QUL IA 0.6450 0.4617 0.2672 0.2672 2.4140 
IA6RND IA 0.8268 0.5838 0.2906 0.2906 2.8454 
       
ES1SRV ES 0.9102 0.9123 0.0187 0.0187 48.5781 
ES2PTN ES 0.8301 0.8284 0.0640 0.0640 12.9747 
ES3SUP ES 0.9432 0.9427 0.0129 0.0129 73.0782 
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Table 3.9  Item Loadings 
            PG      SG      RG      GC      IA      ES 
PG1POL 0.7968 0.3707 0.3858 0.4262 0.1078 0.3947 
PG2STD 0.8048 0.3448 0.2985 0.3365 0.1960 0.2592 
PG4RKA 0.7894 0.5230 0.4665 0.4609 0.1776 0.3875 
PG6CHG 0.7670 0.4522 0.3627 0.4821 0.0712 0.4698 
PG8EAU 0.7144 0.3662 0.2561 0.3099 0.1119 0.2904 
              
SG1STR 0.4272 0.7693 0.5100 0.5798 -0.0097 0.4337 
SG3BGT 0.2622 0.5841 0.2184 0.2561 0.0164 0.1798 
SG4ACA 0.4972 0.8939 0.4025 0.4611 0.1054 0.3700 
SG5ACB 0.4572 0.8490 0.3696 0.4106 0.1256 0.3444 
              
RG3EVT 0.4771 0.3422 0.7662 0.4514 0.2494 0.2923 
RG4XFT 0.4618 0.5215 0.8516 0.6240 0.1927 0.3741 
RG5COL 0.2325 0.2943 0.7421 0.4888 0.1683 0.3483 
RG6CCY 0.3433 0.4504 0.8693 0.6319 0.2218 0.4125 
              
GC1WHA 0.4286 0.4245 0.5867 0.8125 0.1845 0.4589 
GC2WHO 0.4631 0.5050 0.5726 0.8478 0.0983 0.4821 
GC3PRI 0.4533 0.5505 0.6372 0.9072 0.0632 0.5041 
GC4RSC 0.4187 0.4908 0.5181 0.8330 0.1573 0.5250 
GC5FSB 0.5058 0.5467 0.6567 0.9592 0.1521 0.5535 
GC6EXP 0.4898 0.4394 0.5895 0.8088 0.1905 0.4256 
GC7MTR 0.4081 0.3604 0.4724 0.6883 0.0475 0.3953 
              
IA1CMP 0.1036 0.0116 0.1919 0.1461 0.7850 0.2400 
IA2EXP 0.1285 0.1100 0.1944 0.1320 0.7832 0.2663 
IA3ACT 0.1306 -0.0280 0.1258 0.0824 0.6715 0.2083 
IA4EFT 0.1082 0.0719 0.0861 0.0485 0.3876 0.1313 
IA5QUL 0.1218 0.0115 0.1422 0.0723 0.6450 0.1981 
IA6RND 0.1845 0.1033 0.2240 0.1040 0.8268 0.2421 
              
ES1SRV 0.4392 0.4128 0.4260 0.5613 0.3316 0.9102
ES2PTN 0.3706 0.3754 0.3056 0.4695 0.1873 0.8301
ES3SUP 0.4631 0.4149 0.4506 0.4976 0.2864 0.9432
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As Gefen and Straub (2005) point out, it is common to have much higher loadings in PLS than in 
a PCA; a loading above .7 is considered high.  As Table 3.9 shows, each indicator of PG, SG, 
RG, and ES loads much higher on the construct than on any other constructs.  This can be 
verified by either examining horizontally an item’s loadings across all constructs or, vertically, 
loadings on a construct across all items.  The same can be observed in our results from the PCA 
(Tables 3.3 and 3.5). 
 
Also, SG1STR’s loading on SG is at least “an order of magnitude” (Gefen and Straub, 2005, p. 
93) higher than its loadings on other constructs.  Therefore, we decide to retain this item. 
 
Analysis of average variance extracted (AVE) is the next step in testing discriminant validity.  A 
construct with good discriminant validity should have an AVE whose square root is above .50 
and much higher than any correlation among any pairs of constructs (Chin, 1998; Gefen and 
Straub, 2005).  The construct AVEs are listed in Table 3.10 and their correlation coefficients are 
shown in Table 3.11.  As can be deduced from the tables, all of the four constructs meet the 
criteria for discriminant validity.  In other words, the correlation between each of the constructs 
with its measurement items is larger than its correlation with other constructs.  Therefore, all the 
constructs demonstrate discriminant validity. 
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Table 3.10 Average Variance Extracted  
Construct AVE Square Root 
PG 0.6008 0.7751 
SG 0.6132 0.7831 
RG 0.6547 0.8091 
ES 0.8024 0.8958 
 
Table 3.11 Correlations between Constructs 
 PG SG RG GC IA ES 
PG .      
SG 0.5396 .     
RG 0.4679 0.5065 .    
GC 0.5313 0.5755 0.6867 .   
IA 0.1701 0.0739 0.2555 0.1508 .  
ES 0.4757 0.4484 0.4443 0.5718 0.3055 . 
 
3.7.2.4 Discriminant Validity Test for Formative Constructs 
To validate formative constructs, statistics such as reliability and AVE are not applicable (Chin, 
1998; Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue, 2007).  However, an item that contributes to its construct 
should have significant path weights, and these should be examined to evaluate the validity of 
those items.  As can be seen in Table 3.8, for the two formative constructs, GC and IA, all but 
one path is insignificant (IA4EFT).  The items therefore contribute significantly to form the 
constructs of GC and IA. 
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Although IA4EFT has a low t-value, we decided to retain it because items for formative 
constructs measure different aspects of a construct and particular caution should be exercised 
when dropping formative indicators (Petter et al, 2007).  Conceptually this item makes good 
sense and did not raise any concern during Q-sorts.  Thus we decide not to drop the item. 
 
3.7.3 Reliability 
It is difficult to assess reliability for formative constructs, especially with PLS.  For the reflective 
constructs, reliability of the scale was verified, i.e., the correlation between any two items should 
be positive if they measure the same construct (Petter et al, 2007).  Next, we evaluate the 
reliability of those items for the reflective constructs.  Table 3.12 displays the Cronbach’s alphas 
for reflective constructs and they are all above 0.8 expect for SG, which is close to 0.8. 
 








3.7.4 Hypothesis Testing 
The relationships between the governance mechanisms, goal congruence, information 
asymmetry, and effectiveness of information security services are shown in Figure 3.3.  In total, 




Figure 3.3 Structural Model 
 
The path coefficients for the relationships between constructs are displayed in Figure 3.4.  The 
significance (t values) for those coefficients is shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.4 Path Coefficients (SmartPLS Output) 
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Figure 3.5 Path Significance (SmartPLS Output) 
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The structural model shows that all three types of governance mechanisms are positively related 
to goal congruence between IT and business.  SG and RG are strongly related to GC at .02 
and .001 level, respectively, while PG is related to GC at the .10 level.  GC, in turn, is strongly 
related to ES at the .001 level.  Therefore, H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4 are supported. 
 
Interesting findings results surface when information asymmetry (IA) is involved.  The 
relationships between IA and each of the three types of governance mechanisms are all 
insignificant.  Therefore, H1b, H2b, and H3b are not supported. 
 
Since the indicators of IA are self-report measures, a suspicion is that these may be due to the 
lack of objectivity of what the security managers reported.  Thus, we pair up the answers to GC 
and IA items by the security manager and the business manager from the same organization.  
Since all together only 38 pairs were found, the small sample size prevent us from running 
another equivalent model by using the security manager answers to the governance mechanisms 
items and the business manager answers to the GC, IA, and ES items.  However, a series of t-
tests on the two groups’ answers to GC and IA items yield some insights regarding these 
insignificant relationships.  Table 3.13 shows the results of the t-tests. 
 99
Table 3.13 Security and Business Managers Answers to GC and IA Questions  
Item Security Mean 
Business 





GC1WHA 3.97 3.87 .712 IA1CMP 4.18 3.79 .061
GC2WHO 4.11 4.11 1.000 IA2EXP 4.24 3.82 .068
GC3PRI 3.92 3.87 .839 IA3ACT 4.13 3.68 .070
GC4RSC 3.55 3.61 .840 IA4EFT 4.13 3.50 .009
GC5FSB 3.68 3.53 .566 IA5QUL 4.08 3.34 .008
GC6EXP 3.92 3.66 .385 IA6RND 4.26 3.55 .010
GC7MTR 3.16 3.05 .740   
* Scale was 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strong Agree (5). 
These tests reveal that there are obviously no differences between a security manager’s and a 
business manager’s answers to questions about GC.  In other words, the security manager and 
business manager are very similar in their estimates of goal congruence in their organization.  In 
contrast, when it comes to their answers to the IA questions, the significance levels of the t-tests 
are between .008 and .01.  Therefore, there is a fairly high likelihood that the two manager 
groups differ in their estimates of information asymmetry in their organizations.  More 
specifically, security managers tend to see a larger asymmetry than the business managers do. 
 
Another surprising finding we observe in the structural model is the relationship between IA and 
ES.  There is a significant positive relationship between the two (b = .224, p < .05).  Since the IA 
questions are not reverse coded, a higher value means that IT has more information than business.  
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Therefore, a larger information asymmetry is positively related to more effective InfoSec 
services.  The sign of relationship thus is the opposite of what H5 hypothesizes. 
 
3.8 Discussion 
This study creates and empirically tests a set of measures to gauge a company’s IT governance 
mechanisms, goal congruence, information asymmetry, and InfoSec service effectiveness.  Our 
data analyses first validate the psychometric properties of the instrument.  Analyses of the results 
collected from security and business managers reveal both expected and surprising but 
interesting findings. 
 
First, IT governance mechanisms that are implemented as IT process control techniques, 
organizational roles and structures, and relationship building do enhance the goal congruence 
between IT and business.  In terms of process-based mechanisms, the use of security policies and 
standards formalizes and institutes the thought process and practical exercise needed to capture 
users’ business and functional requirements for information security.  These requirements help to 
guide IT in its assessment of the users’ business processes, information assets, and the risks these 
processes and assets may entail.  If proper risk assessment is performed before InfoSec services 
are planned and implemented, the chances are IT will be serving the users’ business objectives 
more closely and effectively.  Continuous effects can be guaranteed by proper implementation 
procedure such as change management and audit of results.  Goal congruence also can be 
boosted via the use of organizational structures such as IT steering committee, IT budget 
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committee, IS audit committee, etc.  The IT steering committee is the most tried and true venue 
by which IT and non-IT units voice and weigh their IT-related, including InfoSec-related 
concerns and priorities.  The IT budget committee can put real teeth into agreed-upon IT 
priorities.  The processes by which this committee works makes sure that those priorities are not 
the results of whims of either IT or business.  As far as InfoSec is concerned, committees such as 
IS audit committee constitute a feedback channel through which IT and business can be on the 
same page with regard to where IT stands in protecting users’ information assets and supporting 
their business processes.  This should prompt IT to anticipate and fulfill user goals for 
information security. 
 
The formal processes and organization structures can never replace the informal “lateral 
organizations” and informal relationships that users build at work to communicate their goals 
and get their job done.  Relational governance mechanisms reduce the randomness in those 
informal structures and relationships and guide them toward congruent goals.  Altogether, the 
process-based, structural, and relational mechanisms facilitate goal congruence between IT and 
business.  Clear understanding of user goals in turn can help IT plan and allocate their priorities 
and activities so that it can better serve the users.  A direct result from such efforts is that users 
see more effective InfoSec services, as judged by the level of protection, business support, and 
customer service provided.   
 
 102
Our research findings strongly support this chain of reasoning.  We find significant positive 
relationships between each of the three types of mechanisms and goal congruence, and between 
goal congruence and InfoSec service effectiveness. 
 
Our findings, however, do not support relationships between the governance mechanisms and 
information asymmetry.  The asymmetry occurs because business users cannot effortlessly or 
costlessly gain access to IT information regarding the InfoSec services.  Therefore, the 
asymmetry theoretically allows IT to act opportunistically and hurt users.  This rather negative 
view of information asymmetry is rooted in agency theory.  It follows that governance 
mechanisms allow users easier access to information on IT competence and actions and, as the 
result, IT will not “shirk” and put in more efforts for the betterment of the users (i.e., the 
principal).  For instance, IS audits done by auditors and impartial audit outcomes guaranteed by a 
properly structured audit committee represent a great source of information to reduce asymmetry.  
Informal relationships theoretically also enable users to gain insight into what IT does for 
InfoSec. 
 
Our analyses, however, show that information asymmetry actually is not related to the 
governance mechanisms.  A possible explanation may be that the profession of InfoSec is such 
that the barrier to acquisition of even shadow knowledge of InfoSec is difficult to surmount.  
Contributing to the reinforcement of such a barrier may be the popular press’ dramatization of 
hacking activities and the common, simplistic practice of equating InfoSec to cryptography.  As 
the result, information asymmetry is not readily amenable to alleviation through governance 
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mechanisms.  For instance, regardless of what informal relationships that the company fosters 
through relational governance mechanisms, a regular user may not have the motivation for more 
informal InfoSec education than the security manager’s occasional elevator speeches.  It may be 
much less enticing for a CEO to leaf through an IS audit report than to peruse a financial audit 
report, which she may feel less daunting to start with. 
 
In fact, the lack of expertise typically is the reason for a principal to delegate a task to an agent.  
In the case of InfoSec, business leaders may view the information asymmetry between IT and 
users a legitimate existence.  This possibly explains the unexpected finding that information 
asymmetry is positively related to InfoSec service effectiveness.  Business leaders entrust IT 
with InfoSec tasks and may view widening information asymmetry as a sign of IT working hard 
on InfoSec.  Indeed, to be more effective in providing security, IT tends to implement more 
sophisticated protection measures and build a wealth of information that is harder to comprehend 
by laypersons.  Even if a layperson tries to obtain information on what IT is doing, advances in 
technologies and attack and protection measures can easily outpace the asymmetry reduction 
process.  Therefore, it is likely that more effective protection comes at the cost of higher 
information asymmetry, especially when the business leaders do not view it as something 
negative that needs to be tamed. 
 
3.9 Theoretical Contribution 
Our study contributes to both the IT governance and agency theory literature as discussed below. 
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3.9.1 IT Governance 
A major contribution of this study is to create an instrument to measure various aspects of IT 
governance.  To date, much of the discussion regarding IT governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Peterson, 2004a, 2004b; Van Grembergen et al, 2004) has been conceptual.  Weill and Ross’ 
study (Weill and Ross, 2004) is empirical but the focus is on the organizing logic of decision 
rights.  Their attention is primarily on the structural mechanisms.  This study marks an early 
effort to empirically measure IT governance practices.  Given the purpose of this study, and 
considering that IT governance is a far-reaching concept, the instrument measures those 
governance mechanisms that are related to InfoSec.  Using survey data, the instrument was 
validated and shown to have satisfactory construct validity.  Future studies thus can take 
advantage of this set of scales for empirical measurement of security governance. 
 
An important utility of IT governance is to ensure the alignment of IT and business goals (Peak 
and Guynes, 2003; Weill and Ross, 2004).  This study indeed supports this hypothesis by 
showing that IT governance mechanisms enhances the goal congruence between IT and business, 
at least as far as InfoSec services are concerned.  While there are previous efforts like Luftman 
(2000) to measure the alignment between IT and business, this study makes a contribution by 
coming up with and testing a much more parsimonious set of measures. 
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3.9.2 Agency Theory 
Baiman (1982) suggests that an approach to empirical validation of the agency theory is to 
concentrate less on deriving optimal compensation contracts because its discussion often is based 
on assumptions and lacks real-life counterparts.  Rather, more fruitful research should 
concentrate more on more easily observed aspects of the firm. 
 
Like Baiman, Nilakant and Rao (1994) suggest that there seems to be a saturation in studies on 
contract design.  Thus, they recommend studying reduction of agency problems through 
organizational design, trust, and collaboration.  In this regard, Nilakan and Rao stress structural 
and cultural mechanisms.  Both are examined in this study, with relational mechanisms being 
equivalent to cultural mechanisms. 
 
Thus, this study contributes to agency theory in performing a much needed test from a concrete, 
organizational perspective.  Instead of simplistically using compensation structure as the cure-all 
solution to agency problems, it peeks into the richness of the variety of governance mechanisms 
that are at the tips of organization for solving their agency problems. 
 
Although goal congruence and information asymmetry are the standard-issue elements in most, 
if not all, discourse on agency theory, they are bypassed in empirical studies.  The hypothesized 
causal link typically goes straight from whatever causal factors in focus to some sort of 
performance measure.  This study thus makes an important contribution by explicating this black 
box of causal relationship and studying the role of these two factors explicitly. 
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More specifically, information asymmetry is generally viewed in a negative light because it 
allows the agent to hide information away from the principal and be able to act opportunistically 
(Baiman, 1990; Pavlou, Liang, and Xue, 2007).  Thus, it should be reduced (Baiman, 1990).  By 
looking at information asymmetry specifically, this study finds at least one situation in which 
information asymmetry may not be all bad and possibly even is indicative of the effectiveness of 
the agent’s actions.  Another contribution is that we create a set of theory-based items to measure 
information asymmetry in the InfoSec context and validate it empirically. 
 
Thus, this study contributes to the IT governance and agency theory literature both by taking a 
closer look at some pivotal constructs and by creating and validating parsimonious sets of scales 
to measure key constructs.  These contributions are tabulated in Table 3.14. 
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Table 3.14 Theoretical Contribution  
Literature Contribution 
Studies governance from the perspective of rich sets of 
mechanisms. 
Creates and validates scales for measuring governance practices 
in the InfoSec context.  Future empirical studies of information 
security governance can take advantage of the instrument. 
IT Governance 
Provides a parsimonious set of scale to assess goal alignment 
between business and IT in the InfoSec context. 
Explicates the black box of causal relationships between agency 
problem control measures and effectiveness. 
Validates the role of goal congruence in controlling agency 
problems.  Brings attention to reconsidering the role of information 
asymmetry. 
Agency Theory 
Provides a set of scales to measure information asymmetry in the 
InfoSec context. 
 
3.10 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study is an early effort to empirically measure and test governance practices from the 
perspective of governance mechanisms.  Although our validation process and results suggest that 
the measurement scales very likely have desirable psychometric properties, it is early to call that 
conclusive.  Also, the external validity of this study can be limited.  This is for two reasons.  First, 
the scope of this study is intentionally limited to information security and more specifically, with 
relation to understanding and fulfilling users’ InfoSec requirements.  While this makes the scope 
of study manageable and measurement scales usable, it is unclear whether the findings can be 
extended to other IT contexts.  Second, given various resource limitations, we are able to collect 
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responses only from a relatively small set of security managers and business managers.  
Researchers of future studies may want to try different channels to collect data from a larger set 
of security managers to validate the findings in this study. 
 
Another type of replication that is suitable for future studies is to design sets of similar measures 
for other IT contexts and examine the usability of those instruments in those contexts.  If the 
instruments demonstrate good psychometric properties and practical usability, it bolsters the 
value of our scales.  A general set of scales to measure IT governance practices across various IT 
contexts may even be possible.  The same can be said of the items we create to measure goal 
congruence and information asymmetry. 
 
It definitively will be interesting for researchers to further investigate the role of information 
asymmetry in agency relationships.  Whereas the importance of goal congruence is fairly 
straightforward, the role played by information asymmetry appears to be more complex than has 
been postulated by theorists and researchers.  It may be because the asymmetry is the reason for 
agency relationships to begin with.  Usually, the asymmetry in specialized knowledge gives rise 
to the agency theory.  However, at least in theory, it also causes further asymmetry in terms of 
knowledge about the task performance.  We try to differentiate between these two types of 
asymmetry and term them expertise-based asymmetry and performance-based asymmetry and 
design our scales around the latter.  We believe that the expertise-based asymmetry is what gives 
legitimacy to agency relationships and thus not what is at play in agency problems.  What we try 
to capture is the performance-based asymmetry, which is the “bad” asymmetry that needs to be 
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reduced.  However, our findings seem to suggest that even performance-based asymmetry may 
be viewed by the principal as legitimate.  Future studies may investigate in more depth the 
differences in expertise-based asymmetry and performance-based asymmetry and their 
respective roles in agency relationships and problems.  It is possible that the principal’s 
acceptance of the asymmetry can depend on the context.  For relatively simple tasks such as 
retail sales or customer service, the principal (the mangers) may not want to allow the agent (the 
cashier or customer service representative) much privilege to the service information.  For more 
complex tasks such as building security defenses for a data center, reduction in asymmetry may 
not mean as much to the principal.  Future research in this direction may yield interesting 
findings that enrich our understanding of agency theory. 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
This study addresses a timely and important issue in information security management that is 
receiving attention recently – the proper governance of the security function.  Governance is the 
key to ensuring that IT provides InfoSec services in such a way that information assets are sound 
and safe and business strategies and objectives are well served by those services.  With this study 
we delve into the various governance mechanisms and examine their efficacy on governance by 
adopting an agency theory perspective.  We hypothesize that the mechanisms have their effects 
through improving goal congruence and reducing information asymmetry between IT and 
business.  We conduct a survey to collect responses from security managers and business 
managers to test our hypotheses.  The analyses of survey data partially support our hypotheses 
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but bring up intriguing questions about the role of information symmetry in the agency 
relationships in the InfoSec context.  We believe it is a research direction for future studies in 
information security governance and agency theory.  Another direction that is worth future 
research efforts is the measurement of IT governance practices.  To conduct this study we create 
and validate a set of measure scales for the three categories of governance mechanisms that have 
been conceptually defined but untested in literature.  With researchers’ interest in IT and security 
governance on the rise, parsimonious, usable, and psychometrically sound scales of IT 
governance practices are indispensable for empirical studies in that area. 
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Information security (InfoSec)     The protection of information and its critical elements, 
including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information. 
Confidentiality     The absence of unauthorized access, disclosure, and use of information. 
Integrity     Information is trustworthy and reliable because it has not been altered or corrupted 
by unauthorized users or computer processes 
Availability     The authorized users’ ability to have timely and reliable access to information 
assets 
IT governance     The organizational capacity to ensure that IT sustains and extends the 
organization’s strategy.  It as the responsibility of the board of directors and executive 
management. 
Process-based governance mechanisms     IT management techniques that ensure that daily 
behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in the effective 
management and use of IT. 
Structural governance mechanisms     Organizational units and roles that are instituted to 
properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal connection between IT 
and business functions. 
Relational governance mechanisms     Organizational practices that encourage voluntary two-
way communication and collaboration between business and IT 
Goal congruence     The extent to which the relative importance of key performance criteria, 
including the achievability of goals, are understood between/among parties. 
Information asymmetry     The situation in which the agent has private information to which 
the principal cannot costlessly gain access. 
Effectiveness of InfoSec Services     The extent to which the services are delivered successfully, 
in terms of business impact, service delivery, and the efficacy of implementation. 
Adverse selection     An agency problem in which the agent exerts the inappropriate type of 
effort.  In this situation, the principal is unable to determine the agent’s qualifications and 
abilities and whether the agent’s decisions and actions are in the principal’s best interest. 
Moral hazard     An agency problem in which the agent exercises inadequate effort.  In this 
situation, the principal is unable to verify the quantity and quality of the agent’s efforts. 
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Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT)     An IT governance 
tool created by IT Governance Institute (ITGI).  CobiT is a process-based governance framework 
that covers the entire life cycle of IT systems. 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)     A set of publications developed 
and endorsed by IT Service Management Forum (ITSMF) that describe the best practices in IT 
processes.  It has a strong focus on IT service delivery and management. 
Code of Practice for Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 17799:2005)     An 
international standard governing information security management.  It provides a series of 











APPENDIX C: MAIL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
IT Governance and Information Security Survey 
  Security Manager Versione    
Time to complete: Approximately 15 minutes 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following statements (1=Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree 
nor Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree): 






1.   Users’ requirements for 
information security are 
addressed in information 
security policies. 
1     2     3     4     5 
2.   Users’ requirements for 
information security are 
addressed in information 
security standards. 
1     2     3     4     5 
3.   Users’ requirements for 
information security are 
expressed as formal or 
informal internal service 
level agreements (SLAs) 
between us (security 
organization) and users. 
1     2     3     4     5 
4.   Risk assessment is 
performed before 
information security 
services are planned. 
1     2     3     4     5 
5.   Information security 
plans are updated in a 
timely manner to address 
changes in user 
requirements for 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
6.   Proper change 
management procedures 
are followed when 
information security plans 
are updated for changes in 
user requirements for 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
7.   Internal IS audits are 
performed regularly. 
1     2     3     4     5 
8.   External IS audits are 
performed regularly by 
accounting firms, 
contractors, etc. 
1     2     3     4     5 
9.   Regular security 
assessments (e.g., 
penetration tests) are 
performed by internal 
testers. 
1     2     3     4     5 
10. Regular security 
assessments (e.g., 
penetration tests) are 
performed by external 
testers such as 
consultants. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 






11. Liaisons or relationship 
managers in business 
units manage the 
relationship with the 
security organization. 
1     2     3     4     5 
12. A liaison or relationship 
manager in the security 
organization manages the 
relationship with other 
departments. 
1     2     3     4     5 
13. Business units often 
invite us (security 
organization) to attend 
business conferences with 
them. 
1     2     3     4     5 
14. We (security 
organization) often invite 
employees in business 
units to attend information 
security conferences with 
us. 






15. Often sponsors events 
where we (security 
organization) interact with 
employees in other 
departments. 
1     2     3     4     5 
16. Implements cross-
functional training between 
us (security organization) 
and other departments. 
1     2     3     4     5 
17. Physically locates our 
offices so that we (security 
organization) have 
maximum interaction with 
employees in important 
departments. 
1     2     3     4     5 
18. Encourages us (security 
organization) and other 
departments to cc each 
other, when appropriate, 
on important decisions. 
1     2     3     4     5 
Continued on back.  Please turn over.  
Security Manager Version 
In my company… 
19. The IT steering committee (or its 
equivalent) is… 
 Non-existent      Ad Hoc Only  
 Permanent (meets regularly) 
 If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer 
Question 19A.  
 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 19A. The IT steering committee (or its 
equivalent) is effective in deciding 
strategic IT matters. 
1       2      3       4       5 
 If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to 
Question 20.  
 
20. The information security committee (or 
its equivalent) is… 
 Non-existent      Ad Hoc Only  
 Permanent (meets regularly) 
 If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer 
Question 20A.  
 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 20A. The information security 
committee (or its equivalent) is 
effective in overseeing important 
information security matters. 
1       2      3       4       5 
 If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to 
Question 21.  
 
21. The IT budget committee (or its 
equivalent) is… 
 Non-existent      Ad Hoc Only  
 Permanent (meets regularly) 
 If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer 
Question 21A.  
 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 21A. The IT budget committee (or its 
equivalent) is effective in overseeing 
IT budget matters. 
1       2      3       4       5 
 If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to 
Question 22.  
 
22. The IS audit committee (or its 
equivalent) is… 
 Non-existent      Ad Hoc Only  
 Permanent (meets regularly) 
 If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer 
Questions 22A and 22B.  
 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 22A. The IS audit committee (or its 
equivalent) is effective in overseeing 
IS audit matters. 
1       2      3       4       5 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 22B. The IS audit committee (or its 
equivalent) is composed of 
members with backgrounds in 
various business functions. 
1       2      3       4       5 
 If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to 




Continued on next page.  
 
 
23. The internal IS audit department (or its 
equivalent) is… 
 Non-existent      Ad Hoc Only  
 Permanent 
 If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer 
Question 23A.  
 
  Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
 23A. The internal IS audit department (or 
its equivalent) is not influenced by 
other departments. 
1       2      3       4       5 
 If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to 
Question 24.  
 
 
In my company, we (security organization) and 






24. What information assets to 
protect. 
1     2     3     4     5 
25. Who in the security 
organization implements 
which security mechanisms. 
1     2     3     4     5 
26. The priorities of 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
27. The allocation of 
resources for information 
security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
28. The feasibility of 
implementing information 
security services. 
1     2     3     4     5 
29. The expected results for 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
30. The metrics to define the 
success of information 
security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
  
In my company, we (security organization) 
have more information than other departments 





31. The precise level of our 
own competence in 
implementing information 
security mechanisms. 
1     2     3     4     5 
32. The precise level of our 
own experience in 
implementing information 
security mechanisms. 
1     2     3     4     5 
33. What we (security 
organization) are doing to 
protect information assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
34. The amount of effort we 
(security organization) 
are exerting. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
In my company, we (security organization) 
have more information than other departments 





35. The quality of services 
we (security organization) 
provide to protect 
information assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
36. The random, external 
factors that may influence 
our effectiveness in 
protecting information 
assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 





37. Top management, in 
general, is satisfied with 
the services provided by us 
(security organization) to 
protect information assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
38. Employees, in general, are 
satisfied with the services 
provided by us (security 
organization) to protect 
information assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
39. Top management, in 
general, is confident that 
information assets are well 
protected. 
1     2     3     4     5 
40. Employees, in general, are 
confident that information 
assets are well protected. 
1     2     3     4     5 
41. Top management, in 
general, feels that the level 
of information security 
supports its jobs well. 
1     2     3     4     5 
42. Employees, in general, 
feel that the level of 
information security 
supports their jobs well. 
1     2     3     4     5 
Continued on back.  Please turn over.  
My company implements the following (please check all that apply): 
Framework / Standard How long has it been implemented (in months) Comments 
 CobiT   
 ITIL   
 ISO17799   
 ISO27001/27002   
 NIST   
 OCTAVE   
 Other third-party governance frameworks*   
 Other in-house governance frameworks*   
 * Please specify in the “Comments” column. 
 
My position:  Position of the person I 




 Less than US$1 million 
 US$1 –  9 million 
 US$10 –  99 million 
 US$100 million – 1billion 
 Greater than US$1billion 
Industry:   
Number of employees 
in company: 
 1 – 99   
 100 – 499 
 500 – 1499 
 1500 – 9999 
 10,000 – 49,000 
 More than 50,000 
 
Thank You! 
Next, Please do these… 
 Insert this questionnaire in the supplied postage-prepaid envelope and mail it back to us. 
 Write your company name on the attached postage-prepaid notification postcard and drop it in the mail 
so that we will know you have responded and will not follow up with you unnecessarily.  To ensure your 
anonymity, please do not put it into the return envelope with the questionnaire. 
Thank you very much for your participation in our research project! If you want to share your insights into 









Andy Wu, Department of MIS, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-0014 • (407) 580-4198 • SecurityStudy@gmail.com 
 
 Definitions      
Security Organization: The organizational unit inside your company that implements and manages information security in your 
company, regardless of its name or location in the organizational chart.  You have been asked to complete this questionnaire 
because of your role inside the security organization.  If you are not involved in information security management, please 
kindly forward this questionnaire to someone who is in that role. 
Business Units/Other Departments: All other organizational units inside your company aside from the security organization, 
whether they are revenue-generating units (production, sales, etc.) or support functions (accounting, legal, etc.). 
IT Governance and Information Security Survey 
  User Representative Versio   
Time to complete: Approximately 10 minutes 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with statements 1-13 and mark your rating for statements 14–38 as instructed. 
In my company, the security organization and other 





1. What information assets to 
protect. 
1     2     3     4     5 




1     2     3     4     5 
3. The priorities of 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
4. The allocation of 
resources for information 
security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
5. The feasibility of 
implementing information 
security services. 
1     2     3     4     5 
6. The expected results for 
information security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
7. The metrics to define the 
success of information 
security. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
In my company, the security organization knows a lot 









1     2     3     4     5 




1     2     3     4     5 
10. What they are doing to 
protect our information 
assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
11. The amount of effort they 
are exerting. 
1     2     3     4     5 
12. The quality of services 
they provide to protect 
information assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
13. The random, external 
factors that may influence 
their effectiveness in 
protecting information 
assets. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
With regard to each of the following, my perception of 
our security organization's performance is…  
(1 = Low, 3 = Average, 5 = High) 
 Low  High 
14. Providing services as 
promised. 
1     2     3     4     5 
15. Dependability in handling 
users' security problems. 
1     2     3     4     5 
16. Performing security service 
right the first time. 
1     2     3     4     5 
17. Providing security services 
at the promised time. 
1     2     3     4     5 
18. Maintaining reliable 
technology and systems. 
1     2     3     4     5 
19. Prompt service to users. 1     2     3     4     5 
20. Willingness to help users. 1     2     3     4     5 
21. Readiness to respond to 
users' requests for security 
services. 
1     2     3     4     5 
22. Making users feel safer in 
using information 
technologies. 
1     2     3     4     5 
23. Courtesy when interacting 
with users. 
1     2     3     4     5 
24. Knowledge to answer 
users' questions about 
threats and protective 
solutions. 
1     2     3     4     5 
25. Giving users individual 
attention. 
1     2     3     4     5 
26. Dealing with users in a 
caring fashion. 
1     2     3     4     5 
27. Having the users' best 
interest at heart. 
1     2     3     4     5 
28. Understanding of users' 
security needs. 
1     2     3     4     5 
29. Proper maintenance of 
security equipment and 
facilities. 
1     2     3     4     5 
30. Maintaining 
professionalism. 
1     2     3     4     5 
31. Providing useful support 
materials (documentation, 
training, videos, etc.). 
1     2     3     4     5 
Continued on back.  Please turn over.  
Business Manager Version 
Regarding information security in my company, my level of confidence in each of the following is… 
(1 = Low, 3 = Average, 5 = High) 
 
 Low  High 
32. Information is accessible 
only to those people who 
have a legitimate reason to 
access it. 
1     2     3     4     5 
33. Information is not altered 
by people with malicious 
intent. 
1     2     3     4     5 
34. Information is not altered 
unintentionally. 
1     2     3     4     5 
35. Information is available 
when needed. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
 
 Low  High 
36. Computer systems remain 
up and running without 
unplanned downtime. 
1     2     3     4     5 
37. Overall, our information 
assets are secure. 
1     2     3     4     5 
38. Overall, the level of 
information security 
supports our business 
functions adequately. 
1     2     3     4     5 
 
 
My position:  Position of the person I 




 Less than US$1 million 
 US$1 –  9 million 
 US$10 –  99 million 
 US$100 million – 1billion 
 Greater than US$1billion 
Industry:   
Number of employees 
in company: 
 1 – 99   
 100 – 499 
 500 – 1499 
 1500 – 9999 
 10,000 – 49,000 
 More than 50,000 
 
Thank You! 
Next, Please do these… 
 Insert this questionnaire in the supplied postage-prepaid envelope and mail it back to us. 
 Write your company name on the attached postage-prepaid notification postcard and drop it in the mail 
so that we will know you have responded and will not follow up with you unnecessarily.  To ensure your 
anonymity, please do not put it into the return envelope with the questionnaire. 
Thank you very much for your participation in our research project! If you want to share your insights into 
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 Definitions      
Security Organization: The organizational unit inside your company that implements and manages information security, 
regardless of its name or location in the organizational chart.   
Business Units/Other Departments: All other organizational units inside your company aside from the security organization, 
whether they are revenue-generating units (production, sales, etc.) or support functions (accounting, legal, etc.). 
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